Author: Bryce Rossler

Find Us A Good Stat on J.J. McCarthy … Believe Me, We’ve Tried

I’m not quite sure how we got here.

In the summer of 2023, Jonathan James McCarthy, 22, of Evanston, Illinois, was not a player very many people considered to be a future first-round pick. Third-wheeling it on Michigan’s run-first national championship team was probably part of his rise, and he appeared 30th on the consensus mock draft five days after the Wolverines hoisted the CFP Trophy. He’d eventually be taken 10th overall by the Vikings and go on to miss his entire rookie season with a torn right meniscus, but you probably already know all this.

What you might not know is: What has inspired the bizarre mythmaking about this particular player? And, furthermore, is there any reason to believe he’ll ever be any good?

Let’s first set the stage here. Among 37 quarterbacks with 100+ attempts, McCarthy currently ranks 33rd in passing Total Points per play with a number that rounds to 0 from the nearest hundredth.

What this means, effectively, is that he has been a replacement-level passer through the first four games of his career (minimum 20 snaps each game), something that can be said of just 24 other quarterbacks in the SIS era (2015-present).

This list is filled with names like Nathan Peterman, Josh Rosen, Paxton Lynch, DeShone Kizer, Dorian Thompson-Robinson, Ryan Finley, and Mitch Trubisky. Just two of them ever became long-term NFL starters: Jared Goff and Josh Allen, with the former playing on a hapless Rams team under Jeff Fisher and the second being a consensus developmental guy with freakish physical ability. Neither of those things can be said about McCarthy.

The highs have been low and the lows have been really low. On plays with an above average Total Points value, he ranks 27th on a per-play basis; on plays with a zero or negative Total Points value, he ranks 34th. Furthermore, his overall positive play rate ranks 32nd at 38%. If your starting quarterback is going to be inconsistent down-to-down with low valleys, these are not the peaks you want.

In aggregate, this produces a quarterback who’s 35th in both boom rate (producing high EPA plays) and bust rate (limiting low EPA plays).

McCarthy has the highest sack rate in the NFL at 11% and the second-highest interception rate at 6%. If those hold, he would be the only player in the SIS era (2015-present) with a sack rate above 10% and an interception rate above 5% in a single season. Before this year, only 11 players ever had a season in which their sack rate was above 8% and their interception rate was above 4%. The last player to do that was Will Levis last season. He was subsequently replaced after just 21 starts.

It’s not readily apparent what he has to hang his hat on. I’ve seen people claim he’s a good athlete and that he’s been good under pressure, but the numbers certainly don’t bear that out. He turns pressures into sacks 26% of the time, 3rd-worst in the league, and his Independent Quarterback Rating under pressure of 32.5 is 2nd-worst in the league. The only QB with a lower positive play rate on scrambles this year (minimum 5 attempts) is his teammate, Carson Wentz.

McCarthy’s expected on-target throw rate +/-, which accounts for factors like throw depth, is the worst in the NFL at an atrocious -13%. (For context, -5% is enough to make you one of the worst any given year).

He barely has a dozen reps of quick game this year, so who’s to say if he’s any good at something his coaching staff isn’t really asking him to do much of? Quick game is typically thought of as easy-to-execute but requires quick processing, touch, and good ball placement, and I think people should be reluctant to prescribe it as a cure-all for struggling, young quarterbacks.

He has the worst Total Points per play on deep throws (20+ yards) besides a 32-year-old Marcus Mariota.

So, what’s the excuse? Kevin O’Connell just won Coach of the Year, if that means anything to you.

The three-deep at wide receiver is one of the best in the NFL with Justin Jefferson, Jordan Addison, and Jalen Nailor; as a group, they rank 6th among top receiving trios in receiving Total Points per route run.

The offensive line is missing Ryan Kelly but has four other veterans holding down the fort, and that unit ranks 19th in pass blocking Total Points per snap. Their blown block rate is 9th-worst, but that’s counterbalanced by the fact that McCarthy faces one of the slowest average times to pressure in the NFL and is just one of four QBs who average 3 seconds or more before pressure arrives on their pressured dropbacks.

It is true that there are things advanced stats can’t capture in McCarthy’s game, like his pre-snap cadence being so bad that the Vikings committed eight false starts at home, the most by any home team in 16 years, per ESPN’s Kevin Seifert.

More seriously, a lot of these splits are admittedly small sample or, in the case of throwing performance vs pressure, statistically volatile. The point is more so that the film says he’s been bad, the stats say he’s been bad, and that there’s currently nothing encouraging to point to outside of the fact that it’s only been four games.

People say that ‘stats don’t lie,’ but if you do enough filtering, you can usually find a split that reflects well on a player. That’s been really difficult to do with McCarthy. For example: on un-pressured throws between 10-19 yards – something a quarterback should look really good at under Kevin O’Connell – he’s 38th in Total Points/pass among 39 quarterbacks with 10 or more attempts.

We’ve seen people make points about his rookie year injury and even about his recent fatherhood, but caveats like that aren’t that unique, and even with that it should be easier to find a slice of success from his statistical record. We’ve looked at this from a few different angles that should afford him some grace, but so far there isn’t anything too encouraging. All Vikings fans really have right now is mythmaking and wishcasting positive regression.

November 14, 2025
Nevermore? The 1-3 Ravens’ Playoff Path

Photo: William Purnell/Icon Sportswire

Prior to the season kicking off, the Baltimore Ravens were +400 to win the AFC. Those were the second-best odds behind only the Buffalo Bills, to whom they lost in the opener despite having a 99.1% win probability with 8:36 to go in the fourth quarter. Since then, not much has gone their way and they stand at 1-3 at the quarter pole with injury issues to boot. Even so, ESPN puts their chances of making the playoffs at 70% and their chances of winning the division at 47%, which puts them neck-and-neck with the 3-1 Steelers (71%/46%).

So, what gives? Let’s start with the fact that, in the past ten years, there have been 11 instances of 1-3 teams going on to make the playoffs. The 2024 Rams were the most recent team to do so, and the Patriots, Steelers, and Eagles all cracked the playoffs in 2021 after dropping three of their first four. That said, 88 teams have gotten off to a 1-3 start over that period, so very few of them have reached the postseason. Put another way: it may not be uncommon, but it is unlikely.

How teams that started 1-3 finished (2015-2024)

1-3 Teams 88

Made Playoffs 11

Percentage 12.5%

Now let’s deal with the particulars: The Ravens are dealing with quite a few injuries at the moment and have a two-game homestand before their bye week. Their schedule was a bit frontloaded and is quite soft after the bye, with those first six opponents sporting a combined 8-16 record. All told, they have the sixth-easiest schedule in terms of opponent net EPA/play after the bye – whereas the Steelers have the sixth-hardest – but they certainly don’t want to be 2-4 or 1-5 heading into it.

In the meantime, they’re missing a lot of key contributors. Nnamdi Madubuike has been ruled out for the season, and several starters did not participate in practice on Wednesday: quarterback Lamar Jackson, left tackle Ronnie Stanley, cornerback Marlon Humphrey, linebacker Roquan Smith, and cornerback Nate Wiggins.

With the exception of Wiggins, who currently ranks 7th among corners in Pass Coverage Total Points/snap, all those players are tenured Ravens who have combined for roughly 5 wins above replacement (WAR) over the past two seasons. That’s a lot of firepower missing, with Jackson deemed ‘unlikely’ to play against the Texans, and Humphrey and Smith both expected to miss at least a few weeks with calf and hamstring injuries.

Assuming they can tread water over the next few weeks, they’ve got some things they’ll have to clean up moving forward. With the caveat being that they’ve faced some of the best passing offenses in the NFL and also the Chiefs, some of their defensive efficiency numbers aren’t the best.

Defensive coaches usually soapbox about tackling, stopping the run, preventing big plays, getting offenses into long down and distances, and creating turnovers, and the Ravens check only one of those boxes. They rank 6th in broken + missed tackle rate, but rank 27th in EPA allowed/rush, have neither forced nor recovered any fumbles, and have just 1 interception to 3 dropped interceptions.

Worse though is the fact that opposing offenses have consistently been in manageable situations. In terms of opponents’ average distance to go on 2nd and 3rd down, the Ravens defense is in the 8th and 15th percentiles, respectively, of all defenses since 2016. That probably has something to do with them allowing a 43% 3rd down success rate, which is 6th percentile over the same timespan. Put more simply: opposing offenses have stayed on schedule and converted 3rd downs at a high rate accordingly.

There’s also the problematic dynamic of giving up a lot of big plays and not generating any to offset them. The Ravens pass D ranks 30th in boom rate (offensive plays which generate 1+ EPA) and 30th in bust rate (offensive plays which generate -1 EPA or less), which isn’t a great combination. Part of this is they’ve seen the second-most passes of 15+ air yards and have given up the third-most EPA on those passes. They had this problem last year in the aggregate, but corrected in the second half of the year when they ranked 3rd in boom rate and 2nd in bust rate from Week 10 onward.

Ravens Pass Defense: Big Play Breakdown (2025)

Big Play Type Rate Rank

Boom (big play for O) 31st 30th

Bust (big play for D) 30th 30th

On the offensive side of the ball, there have been some bad breaks in big games. The Derrick Henry fumbles were particularly unfortunate considering that he had fumbled just three times in the two previous seasons, and Baltimore lost a total of 36 percentage points of win probability on his fumbles against Buffalo and Detroit.

Matters were made worse by two three-and-outs against the Bills (-17% WPA) and one against the Lions (-14%), and the Ravens offense has just generally taken a downturn in 4th quarters this year. They’re the 7th-best offense in EPA/play through the first three quarters, and the 22nd-best in the 4th quarter. Stripping out turnovers lifts all offenses, but doing so suggests that theirs have been particularly untimely because their 4th quarter EPA/play looks pretty comparable.

There are also some run game balancing issues. Last year, they were top six in success rate on both zone and gap runs and were top 10 in gap usage, but this year they’ve skewed zone-heavy and have simultaneously fallen to 27th in zone success rate. And we should beware of small samples, but Derrick Henry is also tracking for the lowest broken + missed tackle rate of his career at just 4%.

The Ravens’ margin for error going forward is slim, especially in light of the injuries they’ve sustained. However, most 1-3 teams have not been as talented as Baltimore and have not had a two-time MVP quarterback. This is also a particularly weak division with Joe Burrow being out and the Browns being in, so the potential to claw back from down two games is there. Some of this stuff should work itself out over the long-term (e.g. fumble luck on both sides of the ball), but they’ll have to win more early downs on defense, which they should be able to do against their remaining schedule. But first, they have to get to the bye in one piece.

October 2, 2025
How Do Tyler Warren and Colston Loveland Compare As Draft Prospects

Photo: Steven King (left) and David Rosenblum (right)/Icon Sportswire

It has been six years since two tight ends were last taken in the first round of the NFL Draft, when Noah Fant and TJ Hockenson went 8th and 20th overall, respectively. But that trend is likely to change this week, as Penn State’s Tyler Warren (scouting report) and Michigan’s Colston Loveland (scouting report) are both all but guaranteed to have their names called on Day 1.

These players make an interesting case study because they have similar profiles in a general sense – they’re both F tight ends – but are quite different once you dive into the particulars.

Warren is the more powerful of the two and is better with the ball in his hands, whereas Loveland is the better athlete and has true mismatch ability. Both have issues as blockers that we’ll get into.

Let’s begin with the broad strokes and take a quick look at how their teams deployed them in 2024:

As you can see, Loveland spent more time lined up as a traditional tight end, but the rates at which they moved out wide (including as an X) or into the slot were pretty similar (41% for Warren, 44% for Loveland). It’s also worth noting that the on-ball and off-ball splits are meaningfully different, particularly because they speak to the types of blocks these players were being asked to execute, which we’ll return to in a moment.

For now, let’s focus on them as receivers since their positional breakdown indicates they’re receiving threats first and foremost.

Let’s start with Warren, whose big selling point is that he’s a YAC monster. He had a 22% broken + missed tackle rate (BMT) and averaged 6.8 yards after the catch in 2024. That’s not quite Brock Bowers territory (31% BMT and 8.7 YAC in 2023), but both are top-15 marks for qualifying Power 5 tight ends (minimum 50 receptions) over the past 10+ years.

Warren does have some ability to get up the seam and did run a high percentage of vertical routes (19%), but he’s at his best working the short-to-intermediate areas of the field, with his most efficient work from a Total Points perspective coming on out-breakers and under routes (i.e. slants and drags). A middling average depth of target (ADoT) of 6.6 yards rounds out the statistical profile here, although that number is admittedly sandbagged by the fact that screens made up nearly 10% of his targets in 2024.

Loveland, on the other hand, is a better athlete and more threatening at the second and third levels of the defense. 2023 is more instructive in his case because the Wolverines were largely dysfunctional on offense in 2024 even before his season was cut short by a shoulder injury.

During Michigan’s championship season, Loveland ranked 8th among Power 5 tight ends in ADoT (9.6) and was extremely efficient on seams and fades, which made up 10% of his routes. His yards per route run of 2.6 that season was third among tight ends, trailing only Bowers and Jatavion Sanders among tight ends with 50+ targets.

Loveland has a better catch radius and body control in the air but Warren is much stronger at the catchpoint. Take a look:

Catch Percentage

Loveland Warren

Off-Target but catchable 63% 47%

Contested but catchable 45% 64%

There are some similarities, though. Both Loveland and Warren are natural hands catchers who had similar drop rates in 2024 (4.8% and 5.2%, respectively), and both are good route runners who ranked top 10 among tight ends in open rate, although Loveland is the better man separator.

As I noted atop the article: Warren is the more powerful of the two and is better with the ball in his hands, whereas Loveland is the better athlete and has true mismatch ability. The picture that’s been painted of the former thus far may make him seem more like a traditional Y, but both have shortcomings as blockers that are worth discussing.

Circling back to the point that was previously alluded to, Warren played off the ball a lot in a zone-heavy Penn State offense and was largely tasked with cutting off the back side – either by initial alignment or by splitting across – or widening out the front side of outside zone. His blocking skills require some projection considering he has mostly been responsible for generating lateral movement on zone runs and executing 2-back run game. He had a lot of good reps from a backfield alignment tracking to the second level but has seldom been a true point of attack player, with just 26 reps blocking power/duo in 2024. While he has the requisite strength and demeanor to grow into such duties and vertically displace edges at the NFL level, his length is a concern (31 ¾” arms).

Despite having the thinner frame, Loveland was base and down blocking more in Michigan’s offense, especially in 2023 under Harbaugh. He is also a willing blocker and has superior length to Warren, so the question here is not one of experience or length but of functional strength to root out NFL bodies on the edge.

It could be said that Loveland could get stronger whereas Warren’s arms will not grow anymore, but it may be difficult to accomplish the former without compromising one of his biggest selling points – his quickness and fluidity. Ultimately, both these players project better to zone schemes, albeit for different reasons. That said, most NFL teams skew zone-heavy anyway, and would be perfectly happy to settle for tight ends who are willing blockers provided they check enough boxes as receivers.

Warren and Loveland are very talented and at this point it should be clear that team fit may be more important than anything in terms of who comes off the board first. However, we can still tie this off with a general statistical comparison of Loveland and Warren to both each other and tight ends who have been drafted since 2016:

As you can see, both are pretty good receivers even in comparison to the pool of tight ends who have been drafted over the years, although interestingly enough Warren falls just below the median as a run blocker.

It should be reiterated that these players excel at different functions and therefore, that this is more of a 1A/1B situation than an exercise in picking a clear-cut better prospect. Risk tolerance likely factors in, as well, with Warren’s game feeling more familiar and therefore more bankable as a security blanket and YAC threat, whereas Loveland seems to have a higher ceiling and more game-breaking potential.

Both players are worthy of being taken in the top half of the first round, but who ends up TE1 seems like an exercise in picking your poison, and whoever lands these players will be hoping to force defenses to do just that.

April 22, 2025

What Do Analytics Show For Edge Rushers In NFL Draft?

Quarterbacks, tackles, edges, and corners – those are the premium positions in the NFL right now. The consensus seems to be that, among those positions, this year’s edge group is the deepest, with ESPN ranking six edge prospects in its top 32 and sixteen in its top 100. Both are the highest among any position group, and there are lots of flavors to be had within this class.

Penn State’s Abdul Carter and Tennessee’s James Pearce Jr. are finesse rushers with a lot of burst off the edge. Texas A&M’s Shemar Stewart and Georgia’s Mykel Williams are long, explosive ends with questions about their production. Mike Green of Marshall is a short, bendy player who led the FBS in sacks. The point of this article is not to give detailed reports on each of these players, but to look at how this year’s edge class fares in some of our advanced metrics, so let’s get into it.

Pressures Above Expectation

In the 2020, and 2023, 2024 NFL drafts, the NCAA leader in Expected Pressure Rate +/- (xPressure Rate +/-) among draft prospects was the first EDGE off the board (and in 2022, Aidan Hutchinson was the 2nd EDGE off the board.)

Player	Draft Year	xPressure Rate +/-
Chase Young	2020	+12%
Tyree Wilson	2023	+11%
Laiatu Latu	2024	+14%

For the uninitiated, xPressure Rate +/- (and its analog Pressures Above Expectation) is a metric that measures the probability of a player generating a pressure on a play given factors like down and distance and alignment, and then compares that to whether or not they actually generated a pressure.

Were the aforementioned trend to repeat this year, Pearce, Jr. (+8%) would be the first EDGE taken, although that seems unlikely considering Carter is the consensus best player at the position (at least among media).

Player	School	Rank	Expected Pressure Rate +/-
James Pearce Jr.	Tennessee	2nd	+8%
Mike Green	Marshall	4th	+8%
Princely Umanmielen	Ole Miss	11th	+7%
J.T. Tuimoloau	Ohio State	12th	+7%
Donovan Ezeiruaku	Boston College	13th	+6%
Josaiah Stewart	Michigan	14th	+6%
Abdul Carter	Penn State	16th	+6%

Snap to Pressure Times

Carter also holds the distinction of having the fastest average time to pressure of any draft-eligible player with at least 20 pressures at a blistering 2.31 seconds, a testament to his get-off and explosiveness. The second-fastest player was at ‘just’ 2.45 seconds.

Of course, things aren’t as easy in the pros, but the best NFL pass rushers in this metric any given year typically hover at around 2.5 seconds. Furthermore, the 2023 collegiate leader was Carter’s former teammate Chop Robinson at an insane 2.11 seconds.He averaged 2.69 seconds in his rookie season with the Dolphins (still good for top 15).

Player	School	Pressures	Avg. Snap to Pressure
Abdul Carter	Penn State	52	2.31s
Shemar Stewart	Texas A&M	21	2.45s
Mike Green	Marshall	50	2.52s
James Pearce Jr.	Tennessee	32	2.54s
Princely Umanmielen	Ole Miss	32	2.55s

Stewart is a notable inclusion here considering that he’s been knocked for his lack of production. The length, size, and explosion flashed both on tape and at the combine, but it hasn’t shown up in the stat sheet – he had just 11 TFLs and 4.5 sacks in three seasons – and these advanced stats don’t exonerate him either.

At the other end of this is Arkansas’ Landon Jackson, the only one of the group to exceed an average snap to pressure time of 3 seconds. On top of that, his xPressure Rate +/- is negative. That’s not a great combination, and his pass rush Total Points/snap rank was good but not great (57th among qualifying edge players last season).

Total Points

Some notable players from the 2024 draft class fared pretty well in Total Points in 2023. Robinson (1st), Laiatu Latu (2nd), Jared Verse (6th), and Dallas Turner (30th) are sure to be familiar names. It might also be noted that Pearce Jr., who was extremely hyped at the beginning of last fall, trailed only Robinson and Latu in this metric that year. As for the 2024 leaderboard:

Player	School	Pass Rush Points/Snap	Rank
Princely Umanmielen	Ole Miss	0.16	2nd
Josaiah Stewart	Michigan	0.15	3rd
Mike Green	Marshall	0.14	6th
Abdul Carter	Penn State	0.13	7th
Donovan Ezeiruaku	Boston College	0.11	12th

Meanwhile, Pearce Jr. lurks at 54th and Stewart lags behind at 168th among qualifying players at their positions after ranking 3rd and 29th last year, respectively.

It’s not a good year to need a quarterback, but it is a good year to need someone to affect the quarterback. While there’s not a blue chip like a Myles Garrett in this class, there are lots of traitsy, high-upside players. And when you’re dealing with players who you have to project a bit more, advanced stats like the ones we’ve laid out can help paint a more complete picture.

April 7, 2025

What Does The Data Show About Patrick Mahomes and Favorable Officiating?

Photo: Scott Winters/Icon Sportswire

With Kansas City on the precipice of making NFL history – a Super Bowl threepeat – some NFL fans are feeling a bit of Mahomes fatigue. The 29-year-old signalcaller has already won three Super Bowls, is about to compete for his fourth, and seems poised to be the league’s boogeyman for the foreseeable future. And just like Brady before him, grumbling about favoritism he gets from officiating crews has emerged from those who deny or downplay his greatness.

This largely seems like infantile coping – it doesn’t take a veteran NFL scout to see that Mahomes is extremely talented – but we at SIS are morbidly curious about whether or not there’s any validity to the idea that Mahomes is the NFL’s favorite son.

Fortunately, we track officiating crews as far back as our database goes (2016). We could tell you which crews call the most Defensive Pass Interferences, which crews are more liable to throw flags on the visiting team, which crews throw flags in late-game situations, or which crews get overturned on review the most, and we can also tell you whether or not the Kansas City offense benefits disproportionately from officiating.

It’s first important to acknowledge that each ref crew officiates a bit differently in a given year. For example, in 2024, Clay Martin’s crew called offensive holding penalties almost twice as often as the NFL average, whereas Tra Blake and company came in below the NFL average and rarely flag holds on passing plays.

From here, we can set a baseline for each crew across multiple categories (e.g. home/away, offense/defense, penalty type, situation, etc.) and compare that to a team’s penalty profile in aggregate. If a team consistently sees more (or fewer) penalties than would be expected based on the crews that officiated them, then there’s at least something to talk about.

There are, of course, other factors that could reasonably result in an officiating crew deviating from their baseline in a given game. For example, a team may have a handsy corner who creates a lot of contact and draws a lot of DPI calls. A quarterback might be really good at drawing offsides or pass interference.

Even with that in mind, Kansas City’s offense doesn’t stand out in a meaningful way.

They are one of eight offenses in 2024 who were both penalized below expectation and drew defensive penalties above expectation, but neither of these rates were to an egregious extent. The Chiefs ranked 9th in offensive penalty rate against crew average (-7%) and 12th in defensive penalty rate (+7%), but the latter figure doesn’t compare to the Joe Burrow-led Bengals (+24%) or Josh Allen’s Bills (+26%). Nor does it come even close to the rate at which defenses playing the 2020 Super Bowl champion Buccaneers were penalized (+29%).

In fact, if anything, Mahomes is enjoying fewer flags against the defense than he ever has. In the beginning of his career, defenses playing Kansas City were consistently penalized at a very high rate relative to expectation. There was a run from 2018-2022 where Kansas City saw opposing defenses flagged at a pretty high rate, ranging from +24% at the low end to +38% at the high end. They’re in no way notable over the last two seasons, though.

How impactful is that imbalance in penalties? The net EPA gained on penalties never exceeded 0.65 EPA per game in any season during that window. That may seem high, but it barely cracks the top 50 of single team seasons over the past 9 years, and it pales in comparison to the 2020 Bucs who were 1st at +1.8 per game. The EPA in and of itself admittedly cannot account for wiping big, negative outcomes off the board, but the number isn’t so high in and of itself.

Now, is any of this hard evidence that the NFL issued some kind of officiating mandate or that the referees otherwise showed favoritism to Kansas City? No. You’d need a more rigorous model to control for other variables (including the teams and players themselves) and do some investigative reporting to be able to responsibly conclude such a thing. But, is it interesting enough to throw out there and instigate some discourse while remaining on the fence? Yes, and it’s certainly not what we expected to find, either.

If you’ve already got your tin foil hat on, you’ll have to take it up with the NFL referees’ union, who recently shot down assertions that the Chiefs get favorable calls. That, at the very least, seems to be true the last couple of years, in which penalties have leaned against them on average (in terms of EPA per game). Beyond that, we’re staying out of this for now, and we leave the rest to those of you who are more given to conspiracy theories.

February 6, 2025
Chalk Talk!: NFL Playoff Team Offensive Schemes

The Wild Card Round is upon us, and perhaps the only team you were able to keep up with religiously during the season was your own. A lot goes on in the NFL every week, and you’ve likely caught some glimpses at other teams here and there, maybe during island games, but might not have as good a grasp on the other 31 teams as you do your own.

That’s where this scheme primer comes in. Here, we’ll be providing you with a brief crash course on the offenses of the Wild Card Round teams, packed with advanced tendency stats and football terms you may want to use to flex on your friends in the group chat this weekend. Without further ado, let’s get started.

AFC

#2 Seed Buffalo Bills

The Bills do some interesting stuff on offense. They put their running backs in motion more than any team but the Dolphins, and their backs have the second-highest ADoT of any team in the league. They get their backs out into the pattern at a high rate, but they’ll get them into corner routes and seams rather than just out into the flats or over the ball, which is symptomatic of a passing game that is generally downfield-oriented with high horizontal stretches (e.g. double post) and outside vertical stretches.

They are zone-run heavy (like most teams), which are well-suited to James Cook’s skillset, but they have moving parts gap schemes to supplement it, and will, needless to say, use Josh Allen on designed runs out of these looks.

Lastly, they rank sixth in both RPO and screen rate, which is their form of quick game because they rank 24th in traditional short dropbacks.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: The Bills’ put their running backs in motion the second-most of any team and have the second-highest ADOT.

#3 Seed Baltimore Ravens

This is the bullyball team of the AFC. Two-thirds of the Ravens’ offensive snaps are played in heavy personnel groupings, and they rank last in 11 personnel usage.

They run well no matter the design, ranking in the top five in success rate in both gap and zone schemes. Lamar Jackson obviously makes this easier. Teams have tried stacking the box (second-highest rate in the league) but the Ravens rank first in stacked box run success rate.

The juice in the passing game comes from intermediate and deep concepts, with Jackson having the second-highest ADoT in the NFL and 30% of his throws targeting verticals, post, corners, and crossers. As a result, he’s the quarterback with the highest Boom Rate in the NFL (plays gaining an expected point or more).

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: Two-thirds of the Ravens offensive snaps are in heavy personnel

#4 Seed Houston Texans

The Texans’ offense has used condensed formations more than any other team in the NFL this year (about 27 plays per game). They don’t make great use of the space this affords, with C.J. Stroud throwing out-breakers at the third-highest rate and about twice as often as crossers.

These condensed formations also tend to draw more defenders into the box and contribute, in part, to the top ten rate at which they run into a loaded box. Furthermore, they typically don’t do it very well, ranking sixth-worst in success rate on such carries.

Like other Shanahan offenses tend to be, they’re a zone-heavy team and use a lot of motion, but unlike other Shanahan offenses, they disproportionately use motion to pass and run at the fifth-lowest rate in the league on plays with motion.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: The Texans use condensed formations more than any other team.

#5 Seed Los Angeles Chargers

The arrival of Jim Harbaugh has brought old school football to Los Angeles. This is a gap-scheme, play action-heavy offense that orients itself around power and counter runs and play action shot plays; the Chargers rank 1st in play action rate, 5th in gap run rate, and Justin Herbert is tied for second in ADoT (8.7).

With an interior offensive line that ranks 24th in run blocking Total Points, the Chargers haven’t fully grown into their new identity, ranking 24th in rushing success on gap concepts. They’re largely reliant on the play action game to push the ball downfield, ranking 3rd in net passing EPA with play action and 16th without.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: The Chargers rank 1st in play action rate.

#6 Seed Pittsburgh Steelers

The Russell Wilson offense is the same as ever, and the Steelers’ offense is built around the go-ball. Wilson threw verticals at the 2nd-highest rate in the NFL this year, and outs and flats at the 3rd-highest rate. In fact, half of non-screen attempts by Wilson have targeted a vertical or something relatively short and outbreaking.

Considering Wilson averages a paltry 0.02 EPA/attempt against Cover 3 and that the Steelers are a bottom five team in rushing success against stacked boxes, the key to playing them seems to be stacking the box and playing Cover 3. Let them run boot Flood and check it down to the flat for 5 yards every play, who cares.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: Russell Wilson threw verticals at the 2nd-highest rate in the NFL this year, and outs and flats at the 3rd-highest rate.

#7 Seed Denver Broncos

This is a training wheels offense that relies heavily on screens and boots/sprintouts, ranking 4th and 1st in the NFL in those categories, respectively. Furthermore, they rank dead-last in quick game usage – which makes sense considering Bo Nix wasn’t particularly adept at that in college.

This is a static—last in motion rate—point-and-shoot operation that’s overreliant on screens and scrambles to move the ball in the passing game. They’ve generated 28 EPA on scrambles and screens, which is higher than the EPA they’ve netted across all pass plays (23.6).

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: The Broncos rank 4th in screen usage and 1st in boot/sprintout usage.

NFC

#2 Seed Philadelphia Eagles

The Eagles used more 2×2 formations than anyone in the NFL this year and are more generally motored by West Coast staples which create low, horizontal stretches in zones (think double slants and slant-flat) and triangle reads (like snag), RPOs, and AJ Brown iso concepts.

Their run game is a little zone-heavy but is mostly Saquon-heavy. They haven’t benefitted from Jalen Hurts’ legs like they have in the past; he hasn’t averaged a meaningfully positive EPA per attempt on designed non-sneak runs since 2022. This unit is powered more by its personnel at the skill positions than anything else.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: The Eagles used more 2 x 2 formations than any team in the NFL in 2024.

#3 Seed Tampa Bay Buccaneers

The Buccaneers generated the second-most EPA and the most yardage on screen plays of any team in the SIS database (2015-present). They just generally like to throw near the perimeter, with lots of concepts that feature outbreakers like two-man stick, smash variants, and flood, generally with in-breakers coming into Baker Mayfield’s vision from the other side late in the down.

In the running game, they’re the most efficient gap scheme team in the NFL, which was not on anyone’s bingo card headed into the year. They were 27th last season.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: The Buccaneers generated the most yardage and second-most EPA on screens of any team in the last 10 seasons.

#4 Seed Los Angeles Rams

The Rams don’t look a whole lot different than they have throughout the Stafford era. They’re still running a lot of zone, motion, and play action, and they’re still under center a lot.

The passing game has a lot of high low concepts, outside vertical stretches, and crossing patterns, but their receiving corps doesn’t have a legitimate speed element and they’ve struggled mightily against man coverage this year. They rank 28th in success rate against man coverage, but 1st against zone coverage.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: The Rams crush it against zone coverage (highest success rate), but rank 28th vs man.

#5 Seed Minnesota Vikings

The Vikings are a zone-heavy run team that likes to operate from under center (31st in shotgun usage. However, unlike the Chargers they aren’t aggressive in their pursuit of play action from under center.

The passing game operates in the intermediate-to-deep area of the field, with 54% of Darnold’s passes landing somewhere between 5 and 20 yards downfield, the 3rd-highest rate in the league. Darnold’s 8.7 ADoT is tied with the previously-mentioned Jackson and Herbert.

They work the ball to the outside and over the middle in relatively equal measure, with Darnold hunting crossing routes at one of the higher rates in the league.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: 54% of Sam Darnold’s passes go 5 to 20 yards downfield, the 3rd-highest rate in the league.

#6 Seed Washington Commanders

The upstart Commanders are notable for their varied and successful run game. They’re the most efficient zone running team in the league, but they are 5th-lowest in usage. They are 6th in gap run rate, but their success on such concepts has waned down the stretch.

They’re one of the teams that’s tapped into 3×1 gun strong and setting the back to the tight end in 3x1Y formations, ranking third in the usage of such formations to create unbalanced defensive structures.

The core passing game is pretty standard Air Raid fare like Y Cross and Stick variants, but to supplement that they’ve just generally tapped into some of the more common ‘cheat codes’ and rank 4th in both RPO and play action rate, and 10th in screen rate.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: The Commanders are the most efficient zone running team in the league, but have the 5th-lowest usage rate.

#7 Seed Green Bay Packers

The Packers’ offense is interesting because this is largely an offense that stretches you horizontally and creates a lot of conflict with fast motion, but they don’t really run a lot of true quick game. Their ‘quick game’ is being 2nd in RPO rate and screen rate.

The quarterback is a big play hunter though, and so this is all spiced up with a dose of shot plays whenever LaFleur needs to appease Jordan Love’s urge to launch the ball.

In the run game, they’re a zone-heavy team but rank top 8 in both zone and gap success rate.

They line up in 11 personnel most often (as most teams do), but they’re much more balanced out of it than most teams. They led the league with a 41% run rate.

Re’stat’ing for emphasis: The Packers rank 2nd in RPO rate and screen rate.

January 10, 2025
Chaos Manifest: Measuring How QBs Behave as Passing Plays Break Down

In the past five years or so, expectation-based metrics have gained traction in the football space as a way to standardize performance across different contexts. An even more recent development is the fixation on anticipation which has largely emerged as a way to sensationalize pedestrian quarterback play under favorable conditions (Tua Tagovailoa’s quick releases come to mind).

Expected Snap to Throw +/- (xSTT+/-) fits neatly into this intersection, and I’d like to use it to reframe how we think about dropback outcomes.

Some passing plays take longer to develop than others. A quick-game concept like double slants-stick develops faster than a play action shot play – at least in theory. And xSTT+/- takes factors like shotgun, drop depth and play action to roughly approximate when the ball should come out, and then compares this baseline to the actual snap to throw time on a play.

But, once the quarterback crosses the threshold of when the ball is supposed to be thrown, negative outcomes become more likely as the play unfolds. As the structure disintegrates into good, old-fashioned, backyard football, rushers come unblocked, the pocket collapses, and receivers begin to improvise their routes. This seems fairly intuitive and is borne out in the data:

What is more interesting is what’s occurring within these buckets on a player level. On the front end, when the play still resembles ‘how it’s drawn up,’ quarterbacks do not deviate too much from each other in terms of the rate at which they throw the ball downfield (as outlined in the graph above). Within a quarter of a second – which is a long time in the NFL – on either side of the expected snap to throw time, the middle 80 percent of players (i.e. non-outliers) only deviate from average by about five percent, give or take.

And this speaks to the level of automation NFL quarterbacks have trained towards: in neutral conditions, they all consistently perform the same general task (throwing the ball downfield without putting it in harm’s way).

But, things start to get really weird at a half second beyond the expected snap to throw time. This is when the clock strikes midnight, where deviations ranging from -15% to +25% can be seen even after removing these outliers. And this is where players really begin to differentiate themselves from one another. Let us examine some of these profiles further.

A ready-made comparison is Joe Burrow and Tua Tagovailoa, who will forever be linked to each other as the first two quarterbacks selected in the 2020 NFL Draft. These are players who throw downfield at pretty similar rates, until the tipping point of 0.5 xSTT+/- is reached:

Burrow and Tua diverge sharply once we hit the twilight zone, with Burrow suddenly becoming extremely gunshy. On the one hand, Tua is ‘putting the ball into play’ more often than his counterpart; on the other, Burrow has not made a turnover-worthy throw in this range and Tua has a 5% turnover-worthy throw rate.

This is not the only way players differentiate themselves later in downs. Take, for example, Justin Herbert and CJ Stroud, two players who are very close in terms of the rate at which they make non-turnover-worthy attempts downfield in this 0.5s xSTT+/- range. Outside of that, the composition of other outcomes is different, with Herbert scrambling less frequently, taking fewer sacks, and putting the ball in harm’s way less often, largely as a result of throwing the ball away more:

Herbert averages 0.09 Total Points/dropback here, as opposed to Stroud’s -0.2 Total Points/dropback, largely as a consequence of avoiding bad plays more frequently.

We can also observe this phenomenon in quarterbacks who are considered to be scramblers. Kyler Murray and Russell Wilson both throw the ball downfield at nearly identical rates but behave rather differently otherwise. Murray tends to hold out hope for the big play (and takes a lot of sacks), whereas the aging Wilson simply opts for checkdowns and scrambles:

It should not be surprising, then, that Murray’s Total Points/Play of -0.05 here is much lower than Russ’s (0.33). That puts Wilson among the best in the NFL late in the play, while Murray is in the bottom half of the league.

Ultimately, we’re still talking about a relatively small sample of plays and, therefore, this is subject to variance. These plays could perhaps be bucketed on a more empirical basis – the quarter-second buckets are admittedly a bit arbitrary – in a future study this offseason. There is also an opportunity to examine within-player trends: how behavior at one point in time relates to behavior earlier or later in the play.

Furthermore, attempting to control for external variables, like pressures, is likely needed for a more conclusive affirmation of the preliminary findings outlined here. A play with average snap to throw time when there was early pressure might be similar to a late throw with no pressure, for example. Lastly, it might be prudent to take a more longitudinal approach in future studies.

With few exceptions, quarterbacks in the NFL are too good to be allowed to play under optimal conditions on a down-to-down basis. Efficiency under pressure is crucial, but also has been shown in the past to be noisy. That said, football analytics has come a long way in a short time, and the notion that players can be good or bad under pressure – or even that their behavior under such conditions is somewhat predictable – should be periodically reexamined with newly developed metrics such as xSTT+/-.

December 5, 2024
What should we make of Trevor Lawrence?

Photo:Shaun Brooks/Action Plus/Icon Sportswire

The Jacksonville Jaguars just spent two weeks of their short, fleeting human lives on a small, damp isle off the western coast of Europe, and, given that they’re 2-5, it’s doubtful that Trevor Lawrence and company have returned home to a hero’s welcome.

This is a precarious position to be in, and most certainly is not the breakthrough Jags fans had hoped for following consecutive 9-8 seasons. To make matters worse, the Jags’ second-half schedule is not an easy one, with the Texans, the Vikings, the Lions, and the Packers on it.

There are, of course, some matchups in which they should be favored: the Jets are a sinking ship captained by a quarterback who either checks it down or throws the vertical element in response to playcalls he doesn’t like; the Raiders are a cautionary tale about trying to exit quarterback purgatory; and two games against the Titans means two front-row tickets to watch Will Levis brutally struggle.

But, the final record of the Jaguars is not the central question. The central question is the assessment of Trevor Lawrence. My friend Diante Lee wrote an excellent, film-based piece on Lawrence for The Ringer a few weeks ago, and, now that Lawrence has broken out of his slump, I would like to discuss the matter with a statistical and systemic focus.

Let us begin with the formalities. At Sports Info Solutions, our player value discussions are almost always going to start with our proprietary player value metric, Total Points, and go from there. In this regard, we rather like Lawrence’s campaign thus far. He currently ranks seventh in passing Total Points on a per play basis and is on pace to have his best season as a pro in this category. The contradiction here is that the Jags’ passing attack is inept generally, and this deserves further examination.

Jaguars Passing Offense – Ranks

Stat Rank

Positive Play Percentage 15th

Boom Rate 25th

Bust Rate 24th

That is to say, they are not matriculating the ball, they are not generating big plays, and they are finding disaster on about a fifth of their dropbacks. This is all made worse by the fact that their passing success rate in the red zone is even worse.

It is still possible to nitpick Lawrence, though. His pressure-to-sack ratio, which is a proxy for pocket management, is a bit worse than league average, and he’s good, but not great in expected on-target rate plus-minus (67th percentile) and turnover-worthy throw rate (61st percentile). So, while he’s not a perfect, little angel, he’s still playing reasonably well. Who, then, is to blame for the offensive problems?

One problem is that the Jags are not getting much juice out of their under-center play action game right now. Here are the numbers.

Season EPA

2022 0.23

2023 0.14

2024 -0.03

Lawrence also proved during those years that he was capable of executing it, ranking sixth in Total Points/play among quarterbacks with at least 100 such reps from 2022-2023. This season, he ranks just 18th out of 19 signal-callers with 25+ under center play action snaps. This is nearly 1 in every 6 dropbacks, and it’s dragging him down in the aggregate.

On the other hand, he’s fared much better with play action out of shotgun and ranks first in Passing Total Points/play in that bucket (minimum 15 snaps). And in pure shotgun dropback game, he ranks fifth behind Lamar Jackson, Joe Burrow, Josh Allen, and Patrick Mahomes, in that order. That’s pretty good company!

There are more granular offensive design issues that could be critiqued generally. For instance, they are extremely siloed under center, even relative to the NFL average, and their 3×1 gun strong (back to the 3-receiver side) looks are just a mechanism for read option bubble stuff. They also have too many curl routes in their diet – over a fifth of their routes are curls! – largely due to spamming concepts like spacing. But a more thorough treatment of these issues is outside the scope of this article, so let us move to personnel.

The offensive line is 2nd in pass blocking Total Points, and they share, with Lawrence, the 8th-best pressure rate allowed in the NFL at 28%. The receivers, on the other hand, rank 27th in Total Points/play, 28th in on-target catch rate, and 31st in broken/missed tackles per reception.

On top of that, Lawrence has thrown the most catchable passes into the end zone this season, and just half of them have been caught, whereas the NFL average is above 60 percent. Other than rookie Brian Thomas Jr., this is a group that needs to be liquidated following 2024.

Lawrence just signed a 5-year, $275M contract in June, but there shouldn’t be any feeling of buyer’s remorse. Total Points seeks to identify an individual player’s contribution, and Lawrence is playing well in spite of his lack of receiving talent and problems with the offensive design. Half-hearted efforts to address personnel issues and doubling down on the systemic problems has led us to this point.

It seems unlikely that the Jaguars will go above .500 this year, and maybe that’s for the best. The protagonist, while perhaps not as far along in his development as one would like, is beset by those who aren’t helping get the best out of him. The optimistic position is not that Lawrence can and will improve; this would be nice, but is not necessary per se. The optimistic position is that management will be toppled after 2024, at which point the phenomenon of Lawrence playing well in and of himself will be perceived more clearly in a different context.

October 25, 2024
Study: How Quickly Do QBs Return to Form Following Major Injury?

Photo: Scott Winter/Icon Sportswire

Jon Gruden once asked Tom Moore why Peyton Manning’s backups didn’t get more reps, to which Moore replied: ‘Fellas, if 18 goes down we’re f*****, and we don’t practice f*****.’

According to both conventional wisdom and every modern metric, the quarterback is the most important player on a football field. If you’ve ever seen an Adam Schefter tweet about a quarterback’s contract extension, or looked at an expected points added (EPA) or wins above replacement (WAR) leaderboard, you already know this. And so you also understand why the quarterback is the most protected player on the field.

There are all sorts of rules in place to protect these players. You cannot hit the quarterback late. You cannot hit him high. You cannot hit him low. You cannot land on him. And may God smite you if your hands get anywhere near his face.

But bloodsport is bloodsport, and quarterbacks still can – and still do – get injured. And when quarterbacks go to IR, dreams go to die. This, too, is widely understood. Just last year, an Achilles rupture cost Aaron Rodgers and the Jets their season, and a torn ligament in Joe Burrow’s throwing wrist contributed to the Bengals falling short down the home stretch.

Both of these teams are happy to have their respective signal-callers back in the saddle, but it’s obvious through two weeks of action that neither player is quite right just yet.

63% of Burrow’s throws have traveled five yards downfield or less, and he ranks 19th among in accuracy rate on the (admittedly few) throws he has made further downfield. Meanwhile, Rodgers, who has made a career out of extending plays, currently ranks 30th in Total Points/play on off-platform throws (and he’s been excellent with his feet planted). Burrow is not ripping the ball, and Rodgers is not moving well, even for his age.

So, these players have returned to play, but the question is when will they return to form? We at Sports Info Solutions feel we are well qualified to attempt to answer such a question given the fact that we collect and maintain the most comprehensive football injury database.

In looking at quarterbacks who have missed at least four consecutive games since 2017 and then played meaningful snaps upon their return – i.e. quarterbacks who are not spot starters/backups – we can use Total Points to compare their post-injury performance to their pre-injury performance and determine when the two more or less equalize.

We used an eight-game rolling average up to the game in which the player was injured to establish ‘pre-injury performance’ and then looked at their cumulative, per-play performance through n weeks back from injury. That is, what was their Total Points/play after their first game back, what was their Total Points/play through two games back, and so on.

What we found was that it takes, on average, about four weeks for players to stabilize close to their pre-injury efficiency levels.

‘Stabilize’ is the operative term here. If a player’s pre-injury Total Points/play was 0.2, and he averaged 0.0 Total Points/play on 30 plays in Week 1, and then 0.2 Total Points/play on 30 plays in Week 2, his Week 2 performance will match how he was playing before injury, but it has not yet stabilized in the aggregate there because his Total Points/play over two weeks is still only 0.1.

It is also important to make the distinction that this does not mean that quarterbacks are guaranteed to stabilize at their own pre-injury standards after four weeks. It should only be interpreted to mean that it is generally unrealistic to expect them to stabilize in the aggregate at their own standards until about four weeks. Therefore, there is not much that can be reliably and meaningfully said about these first few weeks of performance. It is, of course, possible that an injury permanently affects a player in some way. The key takeaway here is that the first month after a quarterback returns from a significant injury should not be seen as any sort of indictment against him.

Injuries obviously vary from each other in terms of severity, region, and the ways in which they compromise player movement, but there is one common theme in terms of returning from them: the mental component. Sports Info Solutions’ head of injury operations John Verros, a trained kinesiologist, regards this as an inevitable obstacle for players:

“There is a subconscious, uncontrollable feeling that players have – to protect the body part that was injured,” he said, “And that alters their decision-making.”

Note that Verros refers specifically to decision-making, which is arguably the most important trait for quarterbacks.

“If a player has a full offseason to recover, then it is more likely that they’ll be 100% physically and mentally, but there are no reps like game reps for the mental component,” Verros said.

Burrow and Rodgers, as well as Kirk Cousins and Anthony Richardson, who we’ve yet to mention up to this point, are all getting back into the swing of things physically and mentally. Jordan Love is likely to find himself in the same boat in the not-too-distant future. It’s optimistic to expect them to hit the ground running, but, as they say, time heals all wounds.

September 19, 2024

NFL Scouting Report: Bo Nix

Photo: Brian Murphy/Icon Sportswire

Bo Nix

6-2, 214, Denver Broncos QB

Overall Grade: 6.3

Scouting Report by Bryce Rossler

Summary

Nix is an athletic, gun-shy backup with sufficient accuracy, whose comfort in the quick game is offset by his apprehension to consistently challenge the second-and third-levels of the defense.

Bo Nix is a two-year starting quarterback at Oregon after playing his first 3 seasons, including the 2020 COVID year, at Auburn. In all, Nix played in and started 61 career games. The Ducks were primarily an 11 personnel spread team with a gap-heavy run game and a passing game that emphasized low and high horizontal stretch concepts, with lots of screen and RPO elements. He missed the final 3 games of the 2021 season with a broken ankle. Nix is a good athlete who has the speed and elusiveness to threaten a defense when needed. He has a sufficient build for the position. He is visibly emotional on the field and is a tough competitor, with players rallying behind him at Auburn and Oregon.

Pass Game

Nix displays sufficient footwork and a compact release. He is a good, efficient processor in quick-game concepts, particularly against zone coverages. He demonstrates mediocre anticipation against man coverage and has to see the break to trigger. He is generally avoidant of challenging “NFL open” windows downfield and tends towards checking it down. He works with good eye discipline to hold safeties, and he maintains downfield vision while climbing the pocket or breaking contain. Nix displays sufficient accuracy to the first and third levels of the field, but did not target the intermediate MOF. His ability to make layered throws to that area is a question mark. He has good body control and flexibility to access different arm slots and throw off-platform. Nix looks uncomfortable working from tighter pockets and has a tendency to spray the ball with pressure in his lap. He has sufficient arm strength, but might struggle to consistently make some of the more difficult throws in the NFL (e.g. field outs/comebacks, seams, layered throws into dig windows, fades vs. Cover 2).

Run Game

Nix is a good athlete with the requisite speed to be deployed in QB run game, and he successfully executed zone and gap schemes at Oregon. He has a good burst to get to the corner and is generally more of a one-cut runner than an elusive open-field threat. Nix protects himself and does not typically lower the shoulder to challenge in space. He is unlikely to be consistently effective at sneaks at the NFL level due to his build and lack of power.

Last Word
Nix projects as a quality backup at the next level who has enough ability to be an effective quarterback in standard down-and-distance situations, but will struggle in obvious dropback situations when teams tend to play tighter coverage and/or dial up pressure. He is proficient in the quick game, but his accuracy will not help optimize YAC, which is not ideal for West Coast offenses that would otherwise suit his skillset.

Critical Factors

On 1-9 scale

Accuracy	5
Decision Making/Mental	5
Clutch Performance	5

Positional Factors

Short Accuracy	5
Deep Accuracy	5
Pocket Awareness	5
Footwork	5
Under Pressure	4
Mobility	6
Arm Strength	5
Release	5
Awkward Throw	6
Eye Discipline	6
Leadership	5
Body Comp	5

Strengths

Mobility

Eye discipline

Awkward throw

Weaknesses

Anticipation vs Man

Accuracy under pressure

Willingness to work 2nd and 3rd levels

July 19, 2024

How teams that started 1-3 finished (2015-2024)
1-3 Teams	88
Made Playoffs	11
Percentage	12.5%

Ravens Pass Defense: Big Play Breakdown (2025)
Big Play Type	Rate	Rank
Boom (big play for O)	31st	30th
Bust (big play for D)	30th	30th

	Loveland	Warren
Off-Target but catchable	63%	47%
Contested but catchable	45%	64%

Stat	Rank
Positive Play Percentage	15th
Boom Rate	25th
Bust Rate	24th

Season	EPA
2022	0.23
2023	0.14
2024	-0.03