Author: Alex Vigderman

  • What To Expect From Davante Adams and Micah Parsons Coming Off Their Injuries

    What To Expect From Davante Adams and Micah Parsons Coming Off Their Injuries

    Photos: John McLoughlin (l) and Jevone Moore (r)/Icon Sportswire

    It was a rough week for high-profile injuries, with Patrick Mahomes and Micah Parsons tearing their ACLs and Davante Adams aggravating a hamstring injury. 

    There can be a whole conversation about what Mahomes’ injury means for his career and the Chiefs’ place in history, but situations like this are once-a-decade so there isn’t much to judge from historically. Instead I want to focus on what we could learn about the Parsons and Adams injuries and their return (next year for Parsons, this year for Adams).

    Davante Adams

    The Rams’ No. 2 receiver aggravated a mild hamstring injury in the win over the Lions. He had been playing through it, continuing a strong campaign in which he easily leads the league with 14 receiving touchdowns. 

    The touchdowns are a bit of a distraction from the fact that he ranks 34th in receptions, 25th in yards, and 46th in EPA, but his individual contributions have been notable in that they’ve somewhat unlocked Puka Nacua as well.

    Rams Receiving Production, 2024-25

    Targets EPA Total Points
    Cooper Kupp 2024 100 4 7
    Davante Adams 2025 113 22 18
    Puka Nacua 2024 106 62 36
    Puka Nacua 2025 128 89 51

    Remember that Total Points is our total player value metric that operates in the same currency as EPA. So Adams is outperforming Cooper Kupp’s 2024, but his individual contribution isn’t as extreme as the total productivity of his targets (taking into account the play of others). Nacua was excellent last year, but he’s been otherworldly this year. And there are three games left to pad these totals.

    As for what to expect for the rest of Adams’ season, the Rams’ playoff standing is relevant. Depending on the severity of the strain, hamstring injuries could linger for a few weeks, and there are also ramifications on Adams’ productivity once he does return. 

    Taking a sample from our injury data, the average games missed for a Grade 1 strain is around one game, while a Grade 2 strain is closer to three games. But it should also be noted that even the first game or two back from the injury could be a problem.

    I looked at about 30 wide receiver hamstring injuries over the last several seasons and how much/well they played upon their return, compared to their previous year’s average.

    The results (as seen in the 2 images below) suggest that we should expect Adams to see a slight drop-off in playing time in his first several games, and his per-play output will take a couple games to return to normal.

    Micah Parsons

    The preseason trade of Parsons was one of the stories of the year, and he was having a strong season up until his knee injury this past weekend. Parsons was second in the NFL in pressures and third in sacks despite being eighth in pass rush snaps, unsurprisingly ranking as one of the best pass rushers in the NFL per Total Points.

    In terms of the overall impact to the team, the Packers gained about 4 percentage points on their team pressure rate over last year. Parsons continued to be a weak run defender (below-zero Total Points, which is roughly replacement-level), but Green Bay roughly treaded water in terms of run defense EPA per play and success rate (improved in the former, declined in the latter).

    In looking at a recent sample of 11 edge rushers who tore their ACLs and played at least 9 games after the injury, we can expect a pretty meaningful productivity drop-off in the year following Parsons’ return.

    Edge rusher productivity changes following an ACL tear

    Difference Difference (as %)
    Snaps per G -5 -12%
    Total Points per play -0.01 -25%
    Snap-to-Pressure time +0.23 s -20%*

    * If we assume a floor of 1.5 seconds on this metric

    The average age for this group at the time of the injury was 26, same as Parsons, so we don’t have a strong reason to suspect his recovery will be notably better. And the late injury opens up the possibility that he’ll miss time to start off 2026, let alone the above concerns once he does suit up.

    For now, the Packers will have to make do without their top defensive player, and that’s coming on the heels of losing DT Devonte Wyatt for the season. For Rashan Gary, the pressure is on (pun not intended), especially since his first seven games were worth 25 Total Points compared to just 6 over his last seven games.

  • Which NFL Teams Have Been Most And Least Affected By Injuries In 2025

    Which NFL Teams Have Been Most And Least Affected By Injuries In 2025

    Photo: Jeff Moreland/Icon Sportswire

    Updated 12/31/25

    The narrative about teams most affected by injury this year has shifted over time as key players exit and return, but this year’s conversation started with the 49ers.

    They already knew they were going to be missing Brandon Aiyuk for much of the season (which turned out to be the whole season), and from that point have also sustained injuries to Nick Bosa, George Kittle, Fred Warner, Ben Bartch, Brock Purdy, and Ricky Pearsall, among others.

    However, the subsequent return of many of these players has caused them to be surpassed in the injury accumulation department. And at this point they’re looking quite functional, at least offensively.

    Most Value Lost To Injury, 2025 NFL season (through Week 17)

    Team Games Missed Total Points Missed
    Cardinals 272 244
    Commanders 203 204
    49ers 248 185
    Bills 281 177
    Dolphins 230 171
    Falcons 189 162
    Bengals 152 162
    Buccaneers 238 150
    Saints 215 150
    Giants 248 149
    Lions 304 140
    Chargers 249 138
    Steelers 262 136
    Colts 229 118
    Panthers 167 117
    Bears 318 115
    Chiefs 183 114
    Packers 217 113
    Jets 202 97
    Ravens 173 93
    Texans 227 93
    Jaguars 143 91
    Titans 163 90
    Vikings 155 87
    Browns 178 80
    Raiders 88 78
    Broncos 170 71
    Eagles 162 69
    Cowboys 224 69
    Seahawks 204 66
    Rams 136 65
    Patriots 144 50

    The value we’re measuring here is each injured player’s Total Points per game over his previous 17 games, multiplied by the number of games missed due to injury. This only counts injuries sustained since August 1.

    The Walking Wounded

    Kyler Murray’s injury has not affected the Cardinals’ fortunes as much as you’d think because backup Jacoby Brissett has been serviceable and Murray was not lighting it up, but Murray still ranks among the most impactful injuries of the year by Total Points. Running back James Conner has been a favorite of Total Points for a little bit now, so his absence also looms relatively large. 

    The Commanders are at the top of this list because of Jayden Daniels’ injury-plagued season. But they have also missed wide receiver Terry McLaurin, running back Austin Ekeler, safety Will Harris, and defensive end Deatrich Wise.

    The Bills have more total games missed than any of the teams above them, but the names have not been as big as they could have been. They are notable in that just 19 of their 161 Total Points Missed have come on the offensive side of the ball, which is the second-fewest offensive points lost.

    Others Receiving Votes

    The Bengals have had substantially fewer total games missed to injury than other teams with high-profile quarterback injuries, but Joe Burrow’s missed time alone cost them as many points as many of the teams in the NFL have suffered in total this year. Without that injury they’d rank among the most fortunate teams.

    The Lions and Bears have the most games missed due to injury in the league, but they rank just 11th and 16th respectively in Total Points missed. They’ve been fortunate to not have their biggest names go down so far this year.

    Dodging Raindrops

    The Patriots and Rams are the most fortunate teams so far in terms of health, which sheds a little light on their strong showings this year. The five teams with the fewest Total Points missed due to injury (adding in the Seahawks, Eagles, and Cowboys) are currently a combined 55-25, compared to 37-43 from the five most injured teams.

  • Patrick Mahomes Is Still The King Of Clutch (Despite the Bills Loss)

    Patrick Mahomes Is Still The King Of Clutch (Despite the Bills Loss)

    Photo: Rich Graessle/PPI/Icon Sportswire

    The Chiefs once again lost to the Bills in the regular season, something that they’ve grown accustomed to despite having no issue dismissing Buffalo from the playoffs in recent years. Even as they were sitting a score or two behind for much of the game, the specter of Mahomes Magic loomed, but it didn’t quite manifest in this contest.

    In a world where Bo Nix seems to post a big fourth quarter (after a questionable first three) every week, I thought it’d be helpful to talk about quarterback clutch performance and put Patrick Mahomes into some perspective with others in the league.

    First off, how might we operationalize clutch? I thought of it two ways, in both cases using our player value metric Total Points to draw the comparison. 

    The simple one is performance late in games, comparing fourth quarter production to first-three-quarters production. 

    The more complex one is comparing high-leverage situations to low-leverage ones, building in an understanding that a fourth quarter touchdown when you’re down by 28 points isn’t very clutch. For this we borrow methodology from the baseball world, where we can label a situation’s “leverage index” by comparing how much a team’s win probability can swing in a given situation compared to the average. 

    Leverage can get really high in some situations (like 10x a typical play), but values above 2 are pretty rare in football, so samples get small. So for this purpose I am considering high leverage to be 1.5x and low leverage to be 0.5x an average situation.

    To put that in slightly more concrete terms, here are three 1st-and-10 situations around midfield that have different leverage indices by our calculations.

    Average leverage: 1st quarter, 4 minutes left, 7 point lead

    High leverage (1.5x average): 4th quarter, 4 minutes left, tie game

    Low leverage (0.5x average): 2nd quarter, 4 minutes left, 13 point lead

    I took each quarterback’s relative success in fourth quarters and high-leverage situations (compared to the rest of their plays) and simply averaged them together to come up with a “clutch composite”, if you will. And if we look at current quarterbacks with at least 1,500 evaluated plays in their career so far (roughly two-plus full seasons), it’s not surprising who we find at the top.

    Most clutch current quarterbacks, minimum 1,500 career dropbacks / carries

    Plays TP/play difference*
    Patrick Mahomes 5,890 0.10
    Tyrod Taylor 1,844 0.09
    Kyler Murray 3,633 0.08
    Carson Wentz 4,053 0.07
    Jalen Hurts 3,326 0.06

    * The average of the gap between fourth-quarter and other-quarter performance and high-leverage and all-other-leverage performance

    Would you look at that: Mahomes sits above the rest of his peers in terms of how well he rises to the situation. And he’s done so across a much greater sample size. Josh Allen has had similar overall production, but it’s been more balanced between the low-leverage and high-leverage spots.

    And lest we think that early-career Mahomes is coloring the picture, his most clutch seasons by this measure are the three most recent.

    An aside on other players

    In looking at this research, I figured I’d poke around to see other interesting trends. 

    Bo Nix has had a lot of “no no no yes” games this year, but his performance from a Total Points perspective hasn’t been appreciably better in big-time situations. The Broncos have averaged fourth-quarter scoring that’s almost a touchdown better than the first three quarters, but Nix hasn’t shown that kind of productivity jump on his own.

    Justin Fields has been one the least clutch quarterbacks this year. He’s basically become less clutch every year he’s been in the league. In general, it’s fair to assume that a player’s clutch performance has an outsized impact on the vibes surrounding his season, and that feels particularly relevant when a player gets benched. 

    Drake Maye and Sam Darnold are obvious counterexamples to that last point, as players who have had really strong seasons so far. Maye has been excellent in low-to-medium leverage and quite poor in high leverage. Darnold has been elite in the first three quarters but the worst quarterback in the league in the fourth quarter.

    Of the players who have been the most clutch by this composite measure this year, Michael Penix Jr. is the only one who has been worse in high-leverage spots (and therefore very good in fourth quarters). He’s run up the score or turned it on in garbage time but has not risen to the big moments.

  • What Liam Coen Means When He Says It’s 100% A  Go

    What Liam Coen Means When He Says It’s 100% A Go

    The Jaguars seemed to pull defeat from the jaws of victory against the Bengals on Sunday, enough so that head coach Liam Coen had to answer for a particular fourth down play late in the game.

    With just under 4 minutes left and a 3-point lead, they chose to go for a 4th-and-5 from the Bengals’ 7 yard line instead of lining up for a chip-shot field goal. They failed to convert, and the Bengals proceeded to march 92 yards down the field and score the winning touchdown with barely any time left on the clock.

    Asked about it afterward, Coen said, “In all analytics, in all data, it’s 100% a go.” And in response to that, I watched a TV personality question that statement, saying you have to feel out the situation.

    But honestly, we might not even need to bring analytics into play.

    Normally, there’s a lot of Monday-morning-quarterbacking after having seen the result, and people browbeat the decision-maker in part because of the bad result. But in this spot, the eventual result presents the exact reason why going for it is a good decision! If we knew the Bengals were going to be able to go down the field and score a touchdown with no time left, obviously the Jaguars should be pushing for a touchdown in that spot.

    But let’s take a look at “the analytics” and see how we might have evaluated that question.

    SIS has a win probability model that is trained on the last few years of basic game state information, and it can also incorporate a measure of recent team strength. For fourth down decision-making purposes, we consider the three possible choices (punt, kick, and go for it) and pit them against each other based on historical performance.

    I’ll start with the top-level result: we also would have this as a “go”. I’ll explain in a bit why there could be some slight caveats there.

    Field goal: 77% win probability

    Based on recent league history, we estimate that a field goal from this spot has a 98% chance of bringing your lead to 6. The result is likely to be the Bengals starting their upcoming drive down by 6 at around their own 30, which puts the Jaguars at about a 77% chance to win according to our model, all else equal.

    The Jaguars might think their kicker is better or worse than that average, but there’s really only downside in that wiggle room, given how short the kick is. So that’s not something that makes the decision any more difficult to make.

    Would that number be meaningfully different if we incorporated the strength of the opponent? Not really, because by this point in the game there isn’t that much time for the strength or weakness of a team to exert itself. Anything can happen in a one-drive sample.

    Go for it: 84% win probability

    With the go-for-it option, there are some more considerations.

    If the Jaguars moved the chains, recent data suggests a better-than-even chance of making it into the end zone on that play, but even if they didn’t, we’re looking at a 94% chance of winning. You’re still very likely to score a touchdown, you could kick a field goal and burn a bunch of clock or timeouts, or you could burn clock and bury the Bengals in the shadow of their own goal post.

    If they don’t make it, they’ve still set the Bengals up for a long drive to make. They could force overtime with a field goal (producing a ~50/50 situation), or drive the full distance for a winning score in regulation. In that situation, the Jaguars have a 74% chance of winning.

    We estimate the success rate for a 4th-and-5 near the goal line to be 45%. Right around a coin flip, so right around halfway between the success and failure situations.

    The result is that we estimate a pretty meaningful advantage to going for it over kicking the field goal. Of course, 7 percent is a much less impactful difference late in the fourth quarter than it is in the first, so we wouldn’t have this as a 100% no-brainer, but it’s a decent chunk of value.

    Is the answer that simple?

    When we talk about sports analytics, it’s important to acknowledge two things: “analytics” isn’t some single methodology that produces a monolithic conclusion, and analytical research is not the final answer to any question.

    Our model is going to produce a different win probability for all of these situations than plenty of other models. We’re all using similar inputs, but we’re employing them differently, making different underlying assumptions, and deploying different modeling approaches. If our model is +/- 5 percent different from another model in most situations (not that much in the scheme of things), then it’s possible that another model thinks that there’s a slight lean in favor of a field goal in this spot.

    And what about factors the model doesn’t consider? Were the Jaguars playing below-average football at that time, and therefore could be assumed to have a lower expected success rate on the fourth down try? With our model, that expected success rate would need to be as low as 15% to flip the decision. That’s a tough sell on its own, but maybe a couple specific features of this situation conspire to tip the scales.

    That’s why you want a give and take between the team’s model and the decision makers on the ground. The model is going to consider a whole bunch of factors and operationalize years of relevant history, but it might not be reflecting that the Bengals’ quarterback got hurt earlier in the game, or that the Jaguars’ passing game was generating under 5 yards per attempt in the second half. NFL rules are fairly constrained on what tech can and cannot be employed during the game, so there isn’t much leeway to do in-game model adjustments.

    All of these recommendations should have a fudge factor, which is something we employ in our own fourth down reports. We’ll have some very strong recommendations but given the combination of the model’s wiggle room and the specific context of the game, there are a ton of situations in the squishy middle. It’s in that squishy middle where teams can use some of this context to their advantage; they just have to be conscious of treating that new information with the appropriate number of grains of salt.

  • Lessons from a Decade of Strike Zone Runs Saved

    Lessons from a Decade of Strike Zone Runs Saved

    This article was adapted from our presentation at the 2025 Saberseminar conference in Chicago. We are one of the sponsors of the event, and we highly recommend you check it out if you’re interested in baseball analytics!

    Many of you are aware of our catch-all defensive metric, Defensive Runs Saved. One piece of that is our measure of a catcher’s ability to steal strikes, which we call Strike Zone Runs Saved.

    It’s been a little over 10 years since we put it out, so we wanted to take some time to look back at some notable players, umpires, and teams within the context of Strike Zone Runs Saved. We also want to talk about how much the environment has changed in the time since, and what we’re thinking about the metric now.

    Where to find Strike Zone Runs Saved

    If you can find Defensive Runs Saved, you can find Strike Zone Runs Saved, since it’s one of the many components in that overarching metric.

    But if you’re looking for that piece specifically, you can find it in any of these spots:

    Background

    The ability for catchers to steal strikes based on how they receive a pitch became a topic du jour around the turn of the 2010’s. Catcher framing metrics were ascribing 50+ runs per season to the best framers relative to the average, in part because this was a skill that hadn’t been rigorously examined previously.

    Around that time, we at SIS set out to create a metric that not only measured the catcher’s responsibility for a called strike, but everyone involved in the interaction: the umpire, batter, and pitcher as well.

    In 2014 we announced that metric, Strike Zone Runs Saved, to our clients, and in 2015 we presented that research at the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference. That paper shared the event’s research award that year.

    How the metric works

    At its core, Strike Zone Runs Saved (SZRS) takes the various called balls and strikes in a season and splits responsibility for them between the four people involved: catcher, umpire, pitcher, and batter.

    The core calculation is based on how often strikes are called above/below a calculated expectation, which is based on four factors:

    • Pitch location
    • Ball/Strike count
    • Batter handedness
    • Proximity of the pitch to the catcher’s target (specifically in the left/right direction)

    For each pitch, we give credit for a called strike or ball depending on how likely it was to have been called a strike to begin with.

    For example, a given pitch might be assessed at a 60% expected strike rate given the factors we consider.
    If called a strike we’d attribute 100 – 60 = 40% of a strike across everyone.
    If called a ball we’d attribute 0 – 60 = -60% of a strike across everyone.

    Iterative approach

    The metric follows an approach similar to Jeff Sagarin’s team ratings that have been around for quite a while. The core idea is that we don’t know directly how much of an impact each player/umpire has, but we can observe through a full season of pitches what those people tend to do. From there, we can run the same calculation again with an adjusted assumption, and then our estimates will get a little better. And we can keep doing that until there no longer is much to learn from this process.

    First iteration

    To start, each pitch is treated like the above, where we have an expected called strike rate and we take a plus-minus approach to determine how much credit to apportion.

    In the example above, a called strike with a 60% expected strike rate which would result in +40% of a strike of credit, the value would be split 10-10-10-10 between the four actors involved.

    We do that for every pitch, which results in a measured Extra Strikes Per Pitch (ESPP) for each person over the course of the full season.

    Subsequent iterations

    For every following iteration, we re-run the same set of pitches, but we adjust the calculation to use the ESPP from the previous iteration.

    In that same example, we originally had 40% of a strike of credit to go around. We now subtract out any additional (or reduced) expected called strike rate based on the ESPP of the pitcher, catcher, batter, and umpire involved. If that total was, say, +5%, we’d now have 40 – 5 = 35% credit to go around, and that would now get split evenly among the four actors.

    Then that value gets added to each actor’s ESPP from the previous iteration.

    At the end of each iteration, we check to see if the values are changing much. At a certain point things start to converge on a single set of ratings, and that’s when we stop.

    The result is a value in terms of extra strikes per pitch for each person, which we can then multiply by a computed run value (how many runs it is worth to change a ball to a strike) to get Strike Zone Runs Saved.

    Notables through the years

    Here are some of the leaders and trailers over the 15 full seasons since we started collecting this data.

    Catchers

    Total Runs Saved Leaders

    Yasmani Grandal 87
    Tyler Flowers 85
    Jonathan Lucroy 80
    Russell Martin 72
    Buster Posey 71

    Runs Saved per Season Leaders (minimum 5 seasons)

    Jose Molina 8.4
    Tyler Flowers 7.7
    Russell Martin 7.2
    Yasmani Grandal 6.7
    Miguel Montero 6.6

    Jose Molina, one of the standard bearers of catcher framing value, played only 5 years in this sample, but he made those years count. Yasmani Grandal didn’t have quite that per-season performance, but he has the benefit of having more years of his career in this sample.

    Tyler Flowers is one of those players who people know the name of because of our ability to measure this skill, and you can see why. We talked about it with him for an article a couple years ago, when Defensive Runs Saved turned 20.

    When it comes to guys like Buster Posey who are in the Hall of Fame conversation, ~7 wins of framing value makes a big impact for a player who didn’t play into his mid-to-late thirties.

    Umpires

    Pitcher-friendliest Umpires, SZRS per season

    Doug Eddings 11.5
    Bill Miller 11.0
    Tim Welke 7.4
    Bob Davidson 7.2
    Phil Cuzzi 5.4

    Hitter-friendliest Umpires, SZRS per season

    Paul Schrieber -8.0
    Alfonso Marquez -6.3
    Edwin Moscoso -6.2
    Carlos Torres -5.2
    Gerry Davis -5.2

    You can see that the per-season scale for an umpire isn’t so different from a catcher.

    Doug Eddings and Bill Miller have and have had the most pitcher-friendly strike zones in baseball. They’ve largely gone unchanged over the years, and that consistency puts them quite noticeably above the others.

    At the opposite end of things are the umpires with the most hitter-friendly zones. Paul Schrieber’s career only partly overlapped with this stat, but he stands out on a per-year basis. Alfonso Márquez has been known for years to have a smaller strike zone than most of his peers. But the most hitter-friendly umpires don’t stand out quite so much as the large-zone guys.

    One other note about Eddings, Miller, and Márquez is that though these numbers indicate they favor either the pitcher or hitter more than any other umpires, this does not seem to have impacted how they are viewed by the MLB office. They each been given prominent postseason assignments the last few years, including the last two World Series.

    Batters

    Pitcher-friendliest Batters, SZRS per season

    Xander Bogaerts 1.1
    Curtis Granderson 1.0
    Alcides Escober 0.9
    Hunter Pence 0.9
    Luis Garcia Jr. 0.8

    Hitter-friendliest Batters, SZRS per season

    Dustin Pedroia -1.7
    Rhys Hoskins -1.5
    Carlos Santana -1.4
    Ryan McMahon -1.3
    Yadier Molina -1.3

    Here’s where Strike Zone Runs Saved gets more interesting, because we start talking about players that aren’t part of the typical framing conversation.

    The scale for batters isn’t mind-blowing, just a run per season at the extremes. And that’s not shocking, considering there isn’t some obvious direct mechanism by which the batter might influence a strike call, other than maybe how close he stands to the plate.

    But if we take a little bit of a step back, we start to find some signal.

    Looking at the top 20 names on each list, less than half of the pitcher-friendly category were above average by wRC+ in that timespan. All but one player from the hitter-friendly category was an above average hitter. So there appears to be some kind of reputation effect at play.

    Additionally, 6 of the top 30 players in terms of getting hitter-friendly calls were themselves catchers.

    You often hear about catchers not wanting to get into a tiff with an umpire when they’re batting because they want to get good calls as a catcher, but they seem to get a little bit of favoritism regardless.

    Pitchers

    Pitcher-friendliest Pitchers, SZRS per season

    Kyle Lohse 1.7
    Ryan Vogelsong 1.7
    Hiroki Kuroda 1.4
    R.A. Dickey 1.2
    Jon Lester 1.1

    Hitter-friendliest Pitchers, SZRS per season

    Framber Valdez -1.4
    Zack Wheeler -1.3
    Justin Masterson -1.0
    Anibal Sanchez -0.9
    Yusei Kikuchi -0.9

    In terms of pitchers, we see a similar scale to that of hitters.

    R.A. Dickey’s presence on either end of this spectrum would not have surprised anyone. The knuckleball giveth and taketh away in terms of how catchers and umpires handle it, but in his case it might have giveth just a bit more. We’re accounting for the extent to which the catcher had to adjust to catch the pitch, which would have been the obvious mechanism by which Dickey might have gotten a raw deal.

    That Framber Valdez and Zack Wheeler are still succeeding in spite of having arguably the least pitcher-friendly strike zone is illustrative of their success with ground balls and missed swings, respectively.

    Otherwise, we’re not sure what to make of these lists. There’s some indication that current pitchers might be getting a little less credit. The calculation of Strike Zone Runs Saved uses a rolling two-year window, so slight changes to rules are accounted for, but it isn’t going to move immediately when guidelines change.

    Teams

    We looked at teams two ways:

    • How well do they produce homegrown catcher framing talent?
    • Do catchers they acquire from other teams improve their framing upon arriving?

    (Both of the below tables are in terms of Runs Saved per 1,400 innings, about a full season.)

    Best teams at producing homegrown catchers

    Brewers 18.2 runs, 4 players
    Angels 9.6 runs, 10 players
    Giants 8.9 runs, 8 players
    Mets 7.9 runs, 8 players
    Mariners 7.6 runs, 8 players

    Best teams at improving the framing of acquisitions
    (using a two-year average before and after to smooth out small sample defense stuff)

    Brewers 14.3 runs, 5 players
    DBacks 7.3 runs, 8 players
    Padres 5.4 runs, 5 players
    Braves 1.2 runs, 8 players

    Bringing up a successful player from your system might just be about the player’s talent, and we have a hard time teasing out those elements.

    The Brewers could have been a great example of that, with Jonathan Lucroy’s early career dominance carrying them. However, they’re still at the top of the acquisitions leaderboard thanks to the success of Victor Caratini, Omar Narvaez, and William Contreras after they entered the organization.

    We should also give credit to the Angels, who had strong production with more homegrown catchers (10 compared to 8 for any other leader).

    Over this span three teams set themselves apart in how much improvement their acquisitions showed. Players acquired by the Brewers, Diamondbacks, and Padres over this decade averaged improving by at least 5 runs saved per full season. 

    The Rangers have clearly devalued this skill within their organization, because they ranked last for their acquisitions and third-to-last for their homegrown players.

    Current work

    Command Charting via Computer Vision

    For over a decade we’ve had a product called Command Charting, which involves our scouts plotting the catcher’s target for the pitch. The goal is to measure how well a pitcher hits that target. This data has the secondary benefit of being used for Strike Zone Runs Saved, because called strike rate is modulated by how much the catcher had to adjust to receive the pitch.

    Over the last couple years we have used Computer Vision technology to expand this product to lower levels of play (minors and college). The model is trained using our manually-charted pitch locations off broadcast video, with a predicted catcher location and confidence intervals. Sufficiently-confident catcher target positions make it into our downstream data pipelines.

    This expansion of our toolkit allows us to build a version of Strike Zone Runs Saved in lower levels that doesn’t have to compromise by leaving out some elements of the calculation.

    Simple diagram of the process of creating catcher glove charting from computer vision. Three parts: video, machine learning model, predicted output with confidence range.

    Minor League Strike Zone Runs Saved

    Right now we’re testing out the minor league version of Strike Zone Runs Saved with catcher charting incorporated.

    The key thing to validate first is whether the distance to the catcher’s target changes the expected strike rate for a pitch.

    What we can see here is that, similar to the major leagues, missing the target in the horizontal direction has a meaningful impact on called strike rate, especially when it comes to big misses or dead-on hits. This effect is less extreme than we observe for the majors, but the directionality is the same.

    Strike rate vs. average, by target miss quartile:

    Vertical Horizontal
    Closest: +0.4% Closest: +1.4%
    Close: -0.1% Close: -0.1%
    Far: -0.1% Far: -0.7%
    Farthest: -0.4% Farthest: -2.7%
  • Future First Round Pick Trades Are Back In The NFL Draft!

    Future First Round Pick Trades Are Back In The NFL Draft!

    Photo: Brian Lynn/Icon Sportswire

    The first handful of picks in the 2025 NFL Draft were pretty chalky in terms of who was picked in what order, but not in terms of which teams took those picks.

    The Jaguars offered up essentially a 2026 first round pick and a second rounder (with some late-round picks going both directions as well) for the privilege to select Colorado’s Travis Hunter with the second overall pick. 

    A lot had been made about the fact that each team owned its first round pick at the start of the draft, which hadn’t happened in modern NFL history. I know at least one person (me) thought that there had been somewhat of a reckoning with how teams had viewed those picks, because there had been only one draft-pick-for-draft-pick trade involving a future first rounder over the previous three drafts (the Texans moving up for Will Anderson Jr.)

    However, this first round featured both the Hunter deal and a later trade where the Falcons landed edge rusher James Pearce Jr. Atlanta moved up 20 spots to get back into the first round, which cost them next year’s first.

    Why might I have taken the relative lack of such deals as an indication that teams have re-evaluated their stance on trading future first round picks? In part because the math is pretty hard to reconcile.

    At SIS we have a model for draft pick value, which is based on our Total Points player value system. Using that model, we can compare the projected four-year value of each pick to approximate how fair a draft-pick-only trade was.

    Models of draft pick value generally agree that trading up is bad practice. Teams pay a premium over a fair deal to “get their guy”, when there isn’t that much certainty about whether any one player will pan out over another (with similar grades at least). 

    Taking the first round trades over the last handful of drafts, the average trade involving only current picks involved moving up 5 slots and cost 24 Total Points of excess expected production over the next four years. That’s the equivalent of what you’d expect for the 109th pick, an early fourth-rounder. If a team truly had more certainty in the production or fit for a player, then that extra value should exceed that premium they’re paying compared to a fair deal.

    For the purposes of this article, I’m going to ignore the potential imbalance there, the whole “always trade down” thing. Let’s just say that’s the cost of doing business if you want to trade up.

    Those trades are apples-to-apples though. Future picks have an (understandable) implied discount relative to current picks, so the math gets funkier.

    There have been nine trades in the first round involving future picks over the last five drafts. We can’t do the same math as we did for the other trades, because there’s a discount rate that we need to build in, but we don’t know what that is. 

    What we can do, though, is try to infer what the discount rate would need to be to make the deal fair by the standards of trades teams make. 

    One way we might conceive of this (using the data we have available) is to say that a future pick is worth one less year of production than the equivalent pick in the current year. If we compare pick values over four years to those over three years for the same pick, first rounders are worth about 72 percent of their current value a year later.

    But if we use a discounting function like that, the excess value given by teams trading up is much higher than that of current-pick-only trades. Instead of a fourth-rounder, teams would be averaging giving up an early second-rounder in value. And that checks out, considering trading anything close to an additional current first round pick to move up a handful of spots is excessive.

    So what rate are teams actually using (roughly)? If we try to tune the discount rate so that the excess value for future-pick trades matches with what we see with current-pick trades, future picks are discounted to just one-third of their current counterparts. 

    In a world where a front office doesn’t have a ton of confidence that they’ll be around for more than a year or two it does make sense to discount the future a bit, but to assume a loss of more than half the value in the span of a year feels like a bit much.

    To me, teams trading next year’s first round pick should have to answer multiple of these questions in the affirmative:

    – Are you acquiring a known-quantity star player?

    – Are you a great team with a high chance of that pick being in the back end of the round?

    – Are you getting a top 10 pick, and moving up more than 10 picks?

    – Are you getting additional value back that mitigates the cost?

    That last bit I added to account for the Falcons’ trade for Pearce, because by our math this deal actually works out in favor of Atlanta, which is the only one in this sample that can claim such a thing.

    Of course, the market bears what the market bears, and the team moving down has to agree to it. But that’s the sort of calculus I’d want to see teams adopting when mortgaging the future.

  • Stat of the Week: 10 Seasons Of Strike Zone Runs Saved Part II

    Stat of the Week: 10 Seasons Of Strike Zone Runs Saved Part II

    Last week we looked back at 10 seasons of data for our pitch-framing stat, Strike Zone Runs Saved, which puts a run value on the result of taken pitches, and we looked at which catchers have fared best and worst in those measurements.

    One of the neat things about Strike Zone Runs Saved (SZRS) is its flexibility. It can also be used to evaluate hitters, pitchers, and umpires. We can see which batters and pitchers are getting more or fewer called strikes than expected. We can also see which umpires are calling more or fewer strikes than expected. 

    Batters

    Batters With Most Extra Called Strikes, 2015-2024 (minimum 5 seasons)

    SZRS per season
    Xander Bogaerts 1.0
    Curtis Granderson 0.9
    Wilmer Flores 0.9
    Alcides Escobar 0.9
    Luis Garcia Jr. 0.8

    Batters With Most Extra Called Balls 2015-2024 (minimum 5 Seasons)

    SZRS per season
    Rhys Hoskins -1.5
    Bryce Harper -1.4
    Charlie Blackmon -1.4
    Ryan McMahon -1.3
    Carlos Santana -1.3

    What these tables are showing is that Xander Bogaerts is getting more called strikes against him than he should be (and the most above what he should be of any hitter in the majors in the last 10 seasons). Rhys Hoskins and Bryce Harper are at the other end of the spectrum. They get a more favorably called strike zone than other hitters.

    The scale for batters isn’t mind-blowing, just a run per season at the extremes. And that’s not shocking, considering there isn’t some obvious direct mechanism by which the batter might influence a strike call, other than maybe how close he stands to the plate. 

    However, there does seem to be some kind of a reputation effect at play. You don’t see it as clearly in the top five, but here are the top 20 in each group:

    • Extra strikes: Xander Bogaerts, Curtis Granderson, Wilmer Flores, Alcides Escobar, Luis Garcia Jr., Carlos Correa, Nomar Mazara, Thairo Estrada, Ian Kinsler, Yolmer Sanchez, Mark Canha, Joey Wendle, Logan Forsythe, Isaac Paredes, Brock Holt, Jorge Polanco, Eloy Jimenez, Donovan Solano, Hunter Pence, Domingo Santana
    • Extra balls: Rhys Hoskins, Bryce Harper, Charlie Blackmon, Ryan McMahon, Carlos Santana, Russell Martin, J.P. Crawford, Jed Lowrie, Dustin Pedroia, Cody Bellinger, Freddie Freeman, Yasmani Grandal, Yadier Molina, Nathaniel Lowe, Buster Posey, Carlos Gonzalez, Corey Seager, Shohei Ohtani, Joey Votto, Yonder Alonso

    There are several MVPs and a few near-misses in the hitter-friendly group, and none in the pitcher-friendly group. That seems unlikely to be a coincidence. 

    It’s also notable that there are four catchers in the hitter-friendly group and none in the pitcher-friendly group. At a more macro level, only one player who had at least five years at catcher in the last 10 had more than a quarter of a run per season go against him (Ryan Jeffers). There were 19 catchers on the positive side of that.  

    You often hear about catchers not wanting to get into a tiff with an umpire when they’re batting because they want to get good calls as a catcher, but they seem to get a little bit of favoritism regardless.

    Pitchers

    Pitchers With Extra Called Strikes, 2015-24 (minimum 5 seasons)

    SZRS per season
    Jon Lester 1.6
    Gio Gonzalez 1.2
    Masahiro Tanaka 1.1
    Clayton Kershaw 1.1
    Steven Wright 1.0

    Pitchers With Fewer Called Strikes, 2015-2024 (minimum 5 seasons)

    SZRS per season
    Framber Valdez -1.4
    Zack Wheeler -1.2
    Yusei Kikuchi -0.9
    Eric Lauer -0.7
    Jake Arrieta -0.7

    For those who have believed that Clayton Kershaw gets strike calls because he’s Clayton Kershaw, perhaps his inclusion on the list adds a little something to that belief. He’s among the pitchers who have gotten more calls than expected. That Framber Valdez and Zack Wheeler are still succeeding in spite of having arguably the least pitcher-friendly strike zone is illustrative of their reliance on ground balls and missed swings, respectively.

    We’re not sure what to otherwise make of these lists other than that the strike zone is tighter for current pitchers. The calculation of Strike Zone Runs Saved uses a rolling two-year window, so slight changes to rules are accounted for, but it isn’t going to move immediately when guidelines change.

    Umpires

    More Called Strikes Than Expected (2015-2024, Minimum 5 Seasons)

    SZRS per season
    Doug Eddings 11.7
    Bill Miller 9.5
    Lance Barrett 6.2
    Phil Cuzzi 6.0
    Mike Estabrook 5.3

    Fewer Called Strikes Than Expected (2015-2024, Minimum 5 Seasons)

    SZRS per season
    Alfonso Márquez -6.7
    Edwin Moscoso -6.2
    Mark Wegner -5.3
    Carlos Torres -5.2
    Tom Woodring -4.6

    As we’ve previously noted in Stat of the Week, Doug Eddings and Bill Miller have and have had the most pitcher-friendly strike zones in baseball. They’ve largely gone unchanged over the years. Lance Barrett, Phil Cuzzi, and Mike Estabrook are all big strike zone umpires, though they don’t occupy the same ballpark as Eddings and Miller.

    At the opposite end of things are the umpires with the most hitter-friendly strike zones in baseball. Alfonso Márquez has been known to have a smaller strike zone than most of his peers for years. The spread among the five umpires listed above with the most hitter-friendly zones isn’t as vast as the gap between Eddings, Miller, and their fellow umpires.

    One other note about Eddings, Miller, and Márquez is that though these numbers indicate they favor either the pitcher or hitter more than any other umpires, this does not seem to have impacted how they are viewed by the MLB office. They each been given prominent postseason assignments the last few years. Miller and Márquez worked the 2023 World Series. Eddings was on the World Series crew in 2024.

  • Analyzing Ashton Jeanty’s Eye-Popping & Head-Scratching Stats

    Analyzing Ashton Jeanty’s Eye-Popping & Head-Scratching Stats

    Photo: Steve Nurenberg/Icon Sportswire

    If you haven’t already, check out the SIS NFL Draft website at NFLDraft.SportsInfoSolutions.com. You can find scouting reports, stats, and rankings for the top NFL prospects. Click the hyperlinked names here to see the scouting reports for those players.

    Former Boise State running back Ashton Jeanty set the world aflame with his 2024 performance, starting the year with a six-game stretch of over 200 yards per game and 10 yards per attempt. He finished up with a pedestrian 180 yards per game and 7 yards per attempt, which were good enough to be a finalist for the Heisman.

    He might not be the “generational” talent that caused people to drool over the likes of Saquon Barkley and Bijan Robinson in recent years, but he is plenty exciting and still given a strong starting grade by our scouting staff.

    Of course, with all that hype comes some extra scrutiny, the perennial nitpicking that convinces people not to take a player as high as some might want. I’m here to offer just a little dab, a splash, of cold water based on how others with his rushing profile have performed at the next level.

    Elusiveness

    Jeanty showcased an incredible ability to break tackles in his college career, with a per-carry rate eclipsed by only Javonte Williams among rushers from the 2020 Draft to now with at least 100 NFL carries. His overall elusiveness (broken and missed tackles per attempt) puts him behind only Williams and Bijan Robinson.

    That said, his missed tackle rate is in the middle of the pack, at least among NFL-caliber prospects. And that’s relevant because the results are a bit discouraging for players who had at least 5 percentage points more broken tackles than missed tackles in college (admittedly arbitrary), with worse performance measures and more injuries forcing missed time.

    College Elusiveness Similar (+/- 5%) BT/A > MT/A
    Players 26 14
    EPA per 100 att -2.4 -6.6
    Total Points per 100 att 6.1 3.7
    Games per injury 20.0 14.7

    (For more info on Total Points, see our primer here.)

    Dominance on outside runs

    Jeanty had incredible success rates on outside runs in his last two years at Boise State, roughly 10 percentage points above average. On the flip side, he was less and less successful running between the guards each year.

    Ashton Jeanty Success Rate on inside vs. outside runs

    Inside Outside
    2022 53% 34%
    2023 50% 55%
    2024 42% 57%
    Career 47% 49%

    I’m not sure if you’d expect this, but in general inside runs and outside runs have roughly the same success rate. So when a player shows a tendency to be out of balance with that, it feels like something we should look a little deeper into.

    Jeanty’s outside-inside profile—namely, his success coming more from outside runs—suggests that he might underperform, although he might also be a little healthier. Among players in the last several drafts with at least 200 college carries and 100 NFL carries in their first two years, outside-favoring players in college have been a little worse on a per-carry basis with slightly fewer injuries that have caused missed time.

    College Success% Inside better Similar (+/- 2%) Outside better
    Players 18 9 13
    EPA per 100 att -1.1 -5.5 -5.8
    Total Points per 100 att 5.9 6.0 4.3
    Games per injury 17.1 16.2 21.0

    So you’re out on this guy?

    I’ve somehow put this really exciting player into two buckets that suggest he’s less exciting. That doesn’t mean I’m out, but it does mean I’m glad we’re not hearing top-5-pick level hype.

    Of course, sample size is something we need to be mindful of; we just don’t have a ton of backs to judge on (at least over the years SIS has charted everything above). Have to mention that.

    And not all of these players had the same overall grade coming out. Jeanty’s comps in terms of the combination of these splits are J.K. Dobbins, Javonte Williams, Kenneth Gainwell, Dameon Pierce, Zamir White, and Cam Akers. None of them had the high-level projection that Jeanty does.

    But by the same token, the characterization we’re looking at is stylistic, and not about performance. Yes, we’re using success rate and broken and missed tackles, all of which express skill, but it’s the relative success across splits that we actually care about here. So I think we’re at least justified in bringing some suspicion to the table.

    Little bonus nugget

    To whatever extent you buy what I’m selling above, you might be interested in which of this year’s backs fall into the cluster that has the best historical production. The one that features Jonathan Taylor, Bijan Robinson, Jahmyr Gibbs, Devon Achane, Kyren Williams, Jaylen Warren, and Bucky Irving.

    North Carolina’s Omarion Hampton is in there, although just barely. His career broken tackle rate is 4.9 percentage points higher than his missed tackle rate. He has the same grade from our staff as Jeanty.

    Similar story with Arizona State’s Cam Skattebo, except with a 4.8 and a low-end starter grade from our staff.

    If you want someone who clears the thresholds easily, Oklahoma State’s Ollie Gordon II fits the bill. He has a three-down backup grade, along with a lot of other backs on our board.

  • Stat of the Week: The Last 10 Years of Strike Zone Runs Saved

    Stat of the Week: The Last 10 Years of Strike Zone Runs Saved

     Photo: David John Griffin/Icon Sportswire

    BY ALEX VIGDERMAN

    This year feels somewhat special to us at SIS because it’s the 10 year anniversary of a pretty cool honor, our Strike Zone Runs Saved research winning the Sloan Sports Analytics Conference’s award for the best research paper. The paper was called Who Is Responsible For A Called Strike?

    For those not familiar, Strike Zone Runs Saved (SZRS) is our method of capturing catchers’ skill in gaining extra strikes by framing the pitch as it comes in.

    The core concept is pretty simple. We start with an expectation for how likely the pitch is to have been a strike, and we compare that to what actually happened. That expectation takes into account handedness, the count, the location, and even how much the catcher’s glove had to move off its initial target. We then attach a run value which is basically the value of turning a ball into a strike, which is about a tenth of a run.

    Here are the leaders among catchers who played at least five years in that span, both in total and per season.

    Strike Zone Runs Saved leaders, 2015-24

    Total SZRS
    Tyler Flowers 68
    Yasmani Grandal 66
    Austin Hedges 64
    Christian Vázquez 50
    Roberto Pérez 33

    Strike Zone Runs Saved per season leaders, 2015-24 (min 5 seasons)

    SZRS per season
    Tyler Flowers 11.3
    Yasmani Grandal 6.6
    Buster Posey 5.3
    Austin Hedges 5.3
    Christian Vázquez 5.0

    Tyler Flowers is one of those players who is primarily known because of our ability to measure this skill, and you can see why. We talked with him a couple years ago about it, when Defensive Runs Saved turned 20.

     This range of years covered the back half of Buster Posey’s career, but that half a win (by WAR standards) per year of framing value makes a big impact for a player who didn’t play into his mid-to-late thirties.

    Here are the year-by-year leaders in Strike Zone Runs Saved. Flowers either shared the lead or led outright four straight years.

    Year-By-Year Leaders in Strike Zone Runs Saved

    2015 to 2024

      SZRS
    2015- Tyler Flowers 13
    2016- Flowers & Yasmani Grandal 15
    2017- Tyler Flowers 20
    2018- Flowers, Grandal & Max Stassi 10
    2019- Austin Hedges 18
    2020- Yasmani Grandal 5
    2021- Max Stassi 10
    2022- Jose Trevino 12
    2023- Hedges, Patrick Bailey & Francisco Alvarez 11
    2024- Patrick Bailey 15

    Our Strike Zone Runs Saved data actually dates back further than 10 years. We’ve been tracking it since the 2010 season. An overall leaderboard has Yasmani Grandal (87) at the top, followed by Flowers (85), Jonathan Lucroy (80), Russell Martin (72) and Posey (71).

    Which organizations have developed framing the best?

     It’s hard to know what teams are doing in terms of specific player development practices, but we can try to get at it from different angles.

    For example, over the last decade three teams set themselves apart in how much improvement their acquired players showed year-over-year. Players acquired by the Athletics, Yankees, and Brewers over this decade averaged improving by at least 5 runs saved per 900 innings caught. (We’d give more credit to the A’s and Brewers, though, because they did this across many more players.)

    A team that falls just short of that distinction is the Diamondbacks, who had 18 catcher acquisitions and averaged just under 4 additional runs saved per 900 innings. That’s a big deal because they had some of the worst performance from homegrown catchers (-5 runs saved per 900 innings from 4 players).

    Bringing up a successful player from your system might just be about the player’s talent, and we have a hard time teasing out those elements, but it’s still worth noting that the Guardians clearly outpace the rest of the league in average SZRS from homegrown players (7 runs per 900 innings). The Astros are the only team within a run of them (6.4 per 900 innings) and we should give credit to the Giants, who had similar production (5 runs per 900 inn) with more homegrown catchers (7 compared to 5 for the leaders).

    How much better are today’s framers than catchers a decade ago?

    The strike zone gets adjudicated differently over time, but we can approximate the change in how good catchers are by placing them into each other’s context.

    In other words, we can throw pitch results from the catchers in 2014 (the year before the Strike Zone Runs Saved presentation) in with the 2024 season sample, or vice versa, and compare our evaluation in this blended environment to their original context.

    As an example, Cal Raleigh saved 11 runs with his framing in 2024. If we threw 2014 catchers into the mix, by virtue of that comparison we’d have him estimated at about 14 Runs Saved.

    Correspondingly, Mike Zunino tied for the MLB lead with 16 Strike Zone Runs Saved in 2014. If he had been compared to 2024 players, he would have been more in the 12-13 run range.

    Because every catcher saw different pitches the changes wouldn’t be entirely consistent, but on average the gap is about 4 runs per 900 innings.

    That might not feel like a lot, but it certainly manifests itself at the bottom end of the population. Just based on actual Strike Zone Runs Saved, there were four catchers in 2014 who were worse relative to their context than any 2024 catcher was last year. With this merged group, the bottom 18 catchers are all from 2014.

    Next week, we’ll look at Strike Zone Runs Saved from another angle: how it evaluates the batter, pitcher, and umpire (yep, the stat can do that too). What can we learn about the players who had the most (and least) success over the last 10 years? And we’ll have notes on the umps too.

  • What Two Statistical Mismatches Tell Us About Football Analysis

    What Two Statistical Mismatches Tell Us About Football Analysis

    This weekend the Eagles play the Commanders in the NFC Championship Game. One of the big questions is Jalen Hurts’ health, which primarily matters because in theory the Eagles should have an advantage through the air.

    Here are a couple of compelling schematic splits to make the argument.

    The Commanders defense is 3rd in man coverage usage this year. The Eagles offense is 2nd in success rate* against man coverage, conveniently enough. And Washington’s 23rd defensively. 

    The Commanders are 7th in middle-of-the-field closed (MOFC, i.e. single-high) coverage usage. The Eagles are 3rd in success rate against single-high, and Washington is 19th defensively.

    Success rate = The percentage of plays where the offense’s expected points improved as a result of the play (explanations of expected points can be found in many places, including this article explaining our Total Points stat)

    Huge mismatch alert, right? Welllll…

    Over the last four seasons, there have been a handful (or three) of examples each of similar mismatches late in the year (big gap in ranks, common split for the defense). In those spots we’d expect the offense to feast, potentially with a higher success rate than their average because they’re playing a below-average defense. 

    But that’s not what we find. The in-game success rate is a good bit lower than what both teams had produced prior.

    Results in games with mismatches significantly favoring the offense, 2021-24 Weeks 13+

      Vs Man Coverage Vs MOFC
    Games 11 15
    Offense Previous Success% 51% 52%
    Defense Previous Success% 47% 52%
    Game Success% 41% 47%

    And this isn’t just an isolated phenomenon. I identified dozens of splits—coverage, blocking scheme, run direction, personnel, etc.—and looked for late-season mismatches based on previous performance. This includes games where the defense should be expected to dominate. And the results look similar, albeit a bit tempered.

    Results in games with mismatches, by mismatch type. 2021-24 Weeks 13+

    Favors Offense Favors Defense
    Games 1632 1453
    Offense Previous Success% 51% 40%
    Defense Previous Success% 50% 40%
    Game Success% 47% 41%

    I take three interpretations from this. I’ll lead with the simplest one that is worth mentioning in lots of situations.

    Sample size, regression, etc.

    All of the included mismatches and splits had reasonably robust sample sizes associated with them. Each individual team’s history in a given split might not be super large, but aggregated over the whole league we get hundreds and thousands of plays to work with. 

    However, everything in football is to some extent a small sample. Each team only gets a few dozen passes and a couple dozen runs a game. To analyze anything, you either have to take those results in aggregate and bundle up a bunch of dissimilar plays, or you have to isolate more homogenous but smaller splits. Even having 12 weeks of data in-season and some 50 plays in a fairly refined split is a pretty small amount. So it’s fair to assume that simple regression to the mean plays a big part in mismatches not manifesting in the aggregate.

    Football is a cat-and-mouse game

    Coaches and players engage in constant retooling week to week. Most of these advantages and disadvantages are known to both teams, so they’re each accounting for it (and expecting their opponent to do the same). Highlighting your strengths, nudging away from your weaknesses, avoiding your opponent’s strengths, attacking their weaknesses, all of these tactical gambits happen each week to jumble up the puzzle of figuring out what’s going to happen in a given game.

    Stats don’t stand on their own

    I think this finding emphasizes the value of the interaction of data analysis and film study. I was able to programmatically identify thousands of mismatches between teams in the span of a few minutes. But each of those mismatches has a story behind it, an understanding of the personnel and coaching that can inform the extent to which those findings are bankable going forward.

    Take the Eagles/Commanders passing game splits from above. We know that these teams have played twice already this year. In those games, the Commanders ran Cover 1 (man coverage with a single high safety) 52% of the time. That was nearly double their rate from other games. And in the game that mostly featured a limited passing game (Kenny Pickett at quarterback), they were even more Cover-1-heavy. So we can feel more confident this split will be prevalent in this matchup.

    But the Commanders also had substantially different performances in Cover 1 from game to game. The Eagles had a 57% success rate against it in their Week 11 win, which contributes substantially to their overall excellence in the man and single-high splits (and the Commanders’ struggles). But in the Pickett game they had just a 39% success rate, and even if Hurts plays, his recent performance suggests that his effectiveness will be closer to that of Kenny Pickett.

    So while the above splits are informative of what the game might look like, they’re not necessarily informative of how it’ll work out in a single game. Each time we do any research or cite any stat, we should take it as a conversation starter rather than as a conversation ender