Author: Doug Wachter

  • Opening Act: Stats and scouts evaluate rookies’ defense

    Nearly a month into the MLB season, the signal in the Defensive Runs Saved data is beginning to break free of the noise. The elite defenders are steadily climbing toward the top of the leaderboards, while the less talented gloves are falling to the back of the pack. With that in mind, this seems like a good time for a (very) preliminary evaluation of this year’s crop of rookies.

    We don’t have nearly as much data to go on at the minor league level, so there is very little about a player’s defensive game we can be confident of statistically before he reaches the majors. This is where scouts come in, using their highly trained eyes to fill in the gaps in the data and providing a honed but still subjective understanding of what the player is and what he could be. With some of those rookies off to excellent starts and others struggling as they acclimate to the speed of the major league game, it’s time to compare what scouts saw from the player in the minors to what he’s shown in his small sample of chances in the majors.


    The Rookie: Chris Owings, SS, Arizona Diamondbacks

    The Scenario: Framed as the bat-first option in contrast to Didi Gregorius’ slick glove, Owings (the club’s top positional prospect) won the starting job in camp.

    The Scouts: Baseball Prospectus’ Jason Parks graded Owings out with an average glove and a plus arm, while Baseball America’s Bill Mitchell called him “an average defender at short with enough range, solid infield actions and an average arm.”

    The Numbers: Owings’ defensive numbers have outpaced the scouts lukewarm projections, as his six Runs Saved trail only Troy Tulowitzki for the lead among all infielders so far. Owings has made eight more plays than we would expect from an average shortstop, suggesting that so far, his range has surpassed the scouts’ projections of a near-neutral performance.


    The Rookie: Jackie Bradley Jr., CF/RF, Boston Red Sox

    The Scenario: Last season, Bradley won the job out of Spring Training only to lose it after a disastrous April. Jacoby Ellsbury’s departure and Shane Victorino’s early-season injury woes have forced Bradley into a key role on a club with hopes of repeating last season’s October success.

    The Scouts: Parks hung a 6+ (on the 2-8 scouting scale) on Bradley’s glove to go with a 6 arm, and Baseball America’s Alex Speier agreed that Bradley’s instincts allow him to provide plus defense in center despite lacking the elite speed generally associated with the best defenders at that position.

    The Numbers: Thus far, Bradley’s Defensive Runs Saved totals back up the scouts’ assertions, as he’s been three runs above average between center and left. Between the two positions, Bradley has accumulated seven Good Fielding Plays against five Defensive Misplays and Errors.


    The Rookie: Billy Hamilton, CF, Cincinnati Reds

    The Scenario: The undisputed fastest man in organized baseball made the switch from shortstop to center last season and will roam the outfield at the Great American Ball Park in 2014.

    The Scouts: BA’s JJ Cooper and BP’s Parks agree that Hamilton’s transition to the outfield in 2013 was a success, with Parks noting his “easy plus potential” at the position and Cooper stating that “while his jumps and routes can continue to improve, he has the speed to outrun mistakes.”

    The Numbers: Thus far, Hamilton saved one run for the Reds in center, while committing two Defensive Misplays and recording one Good Fielding Play. He still has a lot to learn about the position, so it would not be a surprise to see his Runs Saved total climb as the year goes on and he grows more comfortable in the outfield.


    The Rookie: Jose Abreu, 1B, Chicago White Sox

    The Scenario: The $68M Cuban slugger was a star in his home country and a former Serie Nacional MVP but faces a clean slate and high expectations stateside as he takes over for longtime face-of-the-franchise Paul Konerko.

    The Scouts: Largely limited to scouting Abreu based off of looks in international tournaments, scouts developed a wide range of opinions regarding his glovework. ESPN’s Keith Law suggested that without a strong commitment to conditioning, Abreu could end up at DH, while Law’s ESPN colleague Jerry Crasnick spoke to a number of scouts who suggested his size belies respectable athleticism that could make him a “solid” first baseman. BA’s John Manuel’s opinion was similar to Crasnick’s source, although he shared some of Law’s concerns, calling Abreu “an adequate defender… as long as he maintains his fitness.”

    The Numbers: Abreu has displayed below-average but not atrocious glovework, costing the South Siders three runs at first base through his first month. Six Defensive Misplays and Errors have more than neutralized the positive value provided by his nine Good Fielding Plays. However, three of those six negative plays occurred in his first five games, so it’s possible that he’s begun to adjust to the American brand of baseball after a rocky introduction to the league, at least as far as his glovework is concerned.


    The Rookie: Xander Bogaerts, SS, Boston Red Sox

    The Scenario: The Aruban phenom, a consensus top prospect in the game, was handed the reins at short after the departure of Stephen Drew.

    The Scouts: Parks grades Bogaerts as an average shortstop with a plus arm, suggesting his less-than-elite range plays up due to excellent instincts. Writing for Baseball America, Sox beat writer Alex Speier expressed confidence in Bogaerts’ performance at short despite a body much larger than the prototypical frame for the position.

    The Numbers: Bogaerts’ performance thus far has not been up to par, as the five runs he’s cost his team land him with the worst fielders in the league. However, Bogaerts’ performance is at the toughest defensive position, an excuse not available to other bottom-dwellers like Ryan Howard and Torii Hunter. While he’s generally made the plays he’s gotten to, Bogaerts’ range has been well below average among shortstops, resulting in a Plus/Minus of -5 that accounts for most of his low Runs Saved total. His outstanding bat and tremendous upside will keep him in the lineup, but if Bogaerts can’t make significant improvements to his defensive game, he could very well end up shifting to the hot corner.


    For most of these rookies, their statistical performance thus far largely mirrors previous reports from the Internet’s most respected prospect writers. For Bogaerts, who has largely underperformed the scouts’ expectations, there’s a long season ahead and still a chance to establish himself as the defensive asset he was projected to be. Each of these elite prospects has a long career ahead of them, with their defensive value a story that has just begun to be written.

  • Trout Fishing for a Defensive Comeback

    Part of Mike Trout’s appeal is his ability to do literally anything on a baseball field. Trout is a line-drive hitter with over-the-fence power. He can propel his prototypical linebacker body to a 6.5-second 60-yard dash and possesses a plus arm that he used to draw accolades on the mound as an amateur. His incredible speed and universally acknowledged baseball instincts and feel for the game made it all the more surprising when he graded out as a subpar defender in 2013 by Defensive Runs Saved. Last year, Trout totaled a nine-run deficit as compared to an average center fielder after saving the Angels 23 runs in center the season before. With his limited Major League track record, and two vastly divergent defensive seasons, it’s difficult to get a read on Trout as a defender. In order to further that understanding, we can take a look at players who experienced a similar drop in defensive performance and how their defense ranked in later seasons.

    To do so, I assembled a list of all the outfielders whose Runs Saved totals fell by more than 20 runs from one year to the next at a single position. That list features 25 pairs of seasons, including Trout’s 2012-13. Two other outfielders in the group also experienced their drop from 2012 to 2013, with Michael Bourn falling almost to neutral after saving 24 runs in 2012, and Torii Hunter costing the Tigers 10 runs as their right fielder last season after saving the Angels 15 the year before. Because we don’t know how they bounced back from their down seasons, it isn’t instructive to include them in this investigation. In addition, we will be unable to glean any relevant information from a player whose down year resulted in his moving off of the position at which he faltered. Hunter’s move to right was precipitated by a disappointing final season manning center for the Angels. He and Andruw Jones changed positions following their down years, while Scott Podsednik failed to see Major League action at all in 2011 after costing the Royals and Dodgers a combined 15 runs in left the prior season. Removing these six pairs of seasons, we have a list of 19 season-pairs in which an outfielder dropped by more than 20 runs from his previous season at the same position and continued to play that position for at least the next season.

    So, what does this group tell us about Trout? In order to answer that question, we first need to determine which of these players’ declines were similar to Trout’s and which ones have very little bearing on our projection of Trout’s future performance. I’ve chosen the simple split between players whose decrease in defensive production was related to an injury and those whose deterioration had no apparent injury associated with it (as was the case for Trout).

    If a player’s drop in Defensive Runs Saved is the result of an injury, his career arc tells us very little about Trout’s future, so we’ll leave those players out when attempting to project Trout for 2014 and beyond. The list of players whose decline was precipitated by an injury includes Curtis Granderson in 2008 (finger fracture), Aaron Rowand in 2006 (nose/ankle fracture), Willy Taveras in 2007 (groin/quad strain), and Austin Jackson in 2012 (abdominal strain).

    We are now left with a group of 15 outfielders who had a decline in defensive performance of more than 20 runs which cannot obviously be explained by injury. The list ranges from players who started as exceptional defenders and fell to average to outfielders who began near average and landed among the worst players in the league at their position and everything in between.

    Trout’s best-case scenario, at least for this season, may well be represented by Michael Bourn’s 2010-2012 seasons. Bourn enjoyed an outstanding 2010 campaign in which he saved 30 runs, making him the best fielder in baseball at any position for that year and earning him a deserved second Gold Glove, as well as his first Fielding Bible Award. While his offense took a significant step forward in 2011, his defense did the opposite, plummeting to three runs below the average center fielder. Bourn’s defensive woes led to a decline in overall production despite a career year with the bat that was split between Houston and Atlanta. In 2012, however, Bourn put it all together, regaining nearly all of his defensive value at 24 Runs Saved while maintaining his offensive gains to post a season valued by Fangraphs at over six Wins Above Replacement (WAR).

    While Trout hopes to achieve a similar bounce-back, there are several important differences between his 2010-11 and Trout’s first two MLB seasons. Trout burst on the scene with his superlative defensive year, while Bourn built up to it, beginning his career as a solid defender and evolving into one of the best glove-men in the league by his third full season.  In addition, Bourn played the 2010 season at 27 years of age, after being drafted out of the University of Houston and playing the majority of four seasons in the minors. Finally, considering a longer timeframe, Bourn lost a significant portion of the defensive value he regained in 2013. If Trout bounces back, he will hope to maintain those gains into future seasons.

    Trout’s (and the Angels’) nightmare situation would look something like Nick Markakis’ 2008-2010. When Markakis saved 22 runs in his age-24 season, thanks largely to his 10-run arm that season, it appeared as though he was poised to establish himself as one of the best all-around outfielders in the American League as he entered his prime. Instead, his defense took a step back in 2009, as he cost the Orioles three runs in the field. The following season, Markakis’ defense fell further, as he cost the Orioles 11 runs and transformed from the best right fielder in the AL to the worst in a span of just two seasons. It’s hard to imagine a player with Trout’s speed and instincts falling further below average after last season, but those cursed with a healthy degree of pessimism can consider Markakis to be his absolute floor.

    As for a likely middle-ground scenario, Franklin Gutierrez’s 2009-2011 probably represents the most apt comparison. In 2009, Gutierrez saved 32 runs, leading all positions as the best defender in the game. In 2010, however, he fell back to earth, grading out as a neutral defender. Gutierrez regained some of his defensive value in 2011, saving an excellent but not earth-shattering 10 runs. This is on par with the bounce-backs of many of the outfielders in the sample, although most didn’t start out with a DRS total among the league leaders, as these three examples and Trout all did.

    As logic would dictate, the larger group of outfielders suggests that Trout is likely to recover some, but not all, of the defensive value he provided in 2012. Of the 15 outfielders, all but three improved in the year following their drop-off. Regression is likely part of the explanation, but there does seem to be a significant trend towards these defenders returning at least some of the way to their superior pre-decline performance. The following table presents the average performance over the three-year period in question for each of these players.

    Year 1 DRS

    Year 2 DRS

    Decline

    Year 3 DRS

    Bounce-back

    13.2

    -12.1

    25.3

    -2

    10.1

    On the whole, these players generally bounce back somewhat from their down seasons, reclaiming nearly half of the performance they lost in their decline years. However, the sample looks even more favorable for Trout when considering only his peers in center field.

    Player

    Pos

    Decline
    Timeframe

    DRS
    Year 1

    DRS
    Year 2

    DRS
    Year 3

    Bounce-
    back

    Matt Kemp

    CF

    2009-10

    -4

    -37

    -5

    32

    Michael Bourn

    CF

    2010-11

    30

    -3

    24

    27

    Gary Matthews Jr.

    CF

    2006-07

    11

    -13

    7

    20

    Nate McLouth

    CF

    2009-10

    5

    -21

    -7

    14

    Franklin Gutierrez

    CF

    2009-10

    32

    0

    10

    10

    Angel Pagan

    CF

    2010-11

    13

    -8

    -6

    2

    Average

    14.5

    -13.7

    3.8

    17.5

    Each of the six center fielders in the sample showed at least some improvement from their down seasons, and on average their third-year performance was closer to their Runs Saved total prior to the decline than it was to their valuation in their down season. Three of the center fielders (Matthews Jr. in 2008, Kemp in 2011, and Bourn in 2012) had a bounce-back of 20 or more runs.

    While these conclusions were reached by two very different methods, the results of this analysis agree with Ken Woolums’ earlier Good Fielding Play/Defensive Misplay-focused look at Trout’s first two seasons in the field. While Trout won’t necessarily perform at the average of his comparable players, it seems as though his true talent level is likely in an intermediate range, in which he’s not as bad as his 2013, and not quite as good as his incredible rookie season, but rather somewhere in between. Although Trout as a total package is essentially unmatched among players in baseball’s current era, we may still be able to learn more about each of his specific skills by analyzing a group of players with a focus on one part of his game. Trout’s defense will be an interesting storyline for the 2014 season, as he hopes to realign his glovework with the rest of his elite five-tool profile.

  • Turbulent Times for Atlanta’s “Every Fifth Day” Rotation

    Spring Training hasn’t been good to the Braves. Doctors determined that both Kris Medlen and Brandon Beachy would need to undergo their second Tommy John surgeries. While acting quickly to bring Ervin Santana into the fold will soften the blow considerably, these injuries have exposed a severe lack of depth in the team’s rotation. Those depth issues did not become a problem last year, as Atlanta led the NL in games started by the first five starters to take the hill for them in the 2013 season.

    Most Starts By First Five Starters, 2013

    Team

    Starts By First Five Starters

    Atlanta Braves

    140

    Cincinnati Reds

    138

    Washington Nationals

    137

    San Francisco Giants

    137

    Arizona Diamondbacks

    133

    This doesn’t necessarily mean the rotation was entirely healthy last season, with Beachy on the shelf through July as he recovered from his first TJ and Tim Hudson’s gruesome ankle injury ending his season prematurely. However, the team’s dearth of starters beyond their opening day rotation did not harm their playoff hopes, as Medlen, Hudson, Mike Minor, Julio Teheran, and Paul Maholm combined to make 140 starts, with rookie Alex Wood making a successful midseason transition to the rotation to cover half of the remaining 22 turns.

    In 2014, however, their alternate options for the rotation are already being tested with Opening Day only a week away. Hudson and Maholm both headed west in free agency, leaving Beachy and Wood to take their places in what appeared to remain a strong and fairly balanced rotation. While the Santana signing replaces the innings they hoped to receive from Medlen, albeit not with the same run prevention attached, Beachy’s injury is a huge blow to the Braves’ chances in a competitive NL East race. With Minor dealing with a bout of shoulder soreness and Gavin Floyd still recovering from a TJ procedure of his own, the Braves’ early-April rotation will be rounded out by Wood and David Hale. After making a short but effective cameo in the rotation in September of last year, Hale prevailed in a thoroughly uninspiring spring competition for early-season innings. Recent pickup Aaron Harang is likely to see at least a turn or two early in the season, while a host of other mediocre options, including Gus Schlosser and Aaron Northcraft, could also be called on to make starts before Floyd and Minor return.

    These injuries spell trouble for a Braves club that led MLB in run prevention last season, allowing their opposition to cross home plate only 548 times. The Nationals should be hungry after a disappointing 2013, and will be hot on the Braves’ trail. Atlanta will need to improve on an already solid run-scoring total (4th in the NL last season), while somehow evading a sizable decrease in their run prevention despite entering the season with a largely patchwork rotation. Without any prospects in the immediate pipeline seeming ready to succeed in the rotation in 2014, the Braves will be counting on durability from the remaining members of the starting staff, as well as healthy returns from Minor and Floyd, if they can even hope to approach their 2013 campaign’s 96-win total.

  • The Same A.J. Burnett Is Not The Same A.J. Burnett

    Last season, A.J. Burnett pitched 191 stellar innings, leading Pittsburgh to its first postseason appearance since Sid Bream’s slide ended the 1992 NLDS. Burnett’s 3.30 ERA was backed up by even better peripherals, as his 2.80 Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) mark was fifth among qualified NL hurlers. While Burnett certainly deserves a lot of credit for his own excellence, the Pirates’ front office put him in a position to succeed, deploying a stingy and well-aligned defense behind him. Although Burnett didn’t always agree with the alignment of that defense, he certainly benefitted from it. As one of the most extreme groundball pitchers in the game, Burnett gets disproportionate benefits from a strong and well-positioned defensive infield like the one he pitched in front of last year, while a poor group of infielders could hurt him more than most.

    Unfortunately for Burnett, his new coworkers include just such a group of infielders. While Pittsburgh received solid infield defense across the board last season, the Phillies occupied the other end of the spectrum, combining around the horn to allow 50 runs more than an average group of infielders. While 18 of those runs are attributable to the now-retired Michael Young, Young’s replacement is unlikely to be stellar, either. Cody Asche, who cost the team seven runs in nearly 400 late-season innings in 2013, is projected for -10 DRS this season, so we’ll replace Philadelphia’s atrocious 25 runs cost at the hot corner in 2013 with that more generous -10.

    Defensive Runs Saved by Position, 2013

    Team

    C

    1B

    2B

    3B

    SS

    LF

    CF

    RF

    Shifts

    Total

    PIT

    10

    -3

    13

    5

    9

    26

    8

    -7

    9

    70

    PHI

    -1

    -2

    -6

    -26

    -16

    -7

    -10

    -9

    -1

    -103

    In order to provide a rough estimate of what AJ Burnett’s 2013 would look like with the 2014 Phillies, we’ll assume that those runs cost and saved were evenly distributed. That is, given that Burnett’s 191 frames accounted for 13 percent of the innings tossed by Pirates pitchers last year, we’ll assume he benefitted from 13 percent of the runs saved by their defense. While a more in-depth analysis would consider Burnett’s batted ball types, pull percentages, and the resulting impact of the various fielders on his performance, for simplicity’s sake, we’ll stick to the quality of the defense behind him as a whole to estimate the magnitude of the possible effect on Burnett’s numbers.

    This back-of-the-envelope calculation estimates the Pirates’ defense saved Burnett just over nine runs last season. Replacing Philly’s third base defense with Asche’s projection (a 15-run improvement) and assuming Burnett shoulders a similar percentage of the pitching load for the Phillies this year results in an estimated 11 additional runs cost against an average defense by the gloves behind him. Burnett allowed 79 runs last season, so by this admittedly simple accounting, the switch in defenses would bump that up to a little over 99 runs.

    Burnett will also be switching parks from a fairly pitcher-friendly PNC to the homer-happy Citizen’s Bank. Making the broad assumption that his talent level at home and on the road is fairly similar, we’ll bump his runs at home up from 49 (half of the defense-adjusted 99 runs) by about 22 percent, or the difference between Pittsburgh and Philly’s park factors for runs. Between the less favorable defense and park, we’d now expect Burnett to allow 109 runs next season, raising his runs allowed per nine innings from 3.72 to 5.13.

    In other words, by this estimate, the change in defenses and parks drops Burnett from a pitcher in the top half of the league to nearly the same level of production as the 2013 season of his new rotation-mate, Kyle Kendrick. While Burnett may have complained about the Pirates’ atypical alignments last season, it probably won’t be long before he’s pining for his days in western Pennsylvania.

  • Mark Trumbo’s Hidden Tool

    When the Diamondbacks, Angels, and White Sox agreed on a three-team deal that sent Mark Trumbo to the desert during this year’s Winter Meetings, the trade was widely panned from the Diamondbacks’ perspective. Many observers felt that the Snakes had given up too much young, controllable talent in a myopic search for power, failing to stop and consider the contributions (or lack thereof) Trumbo would make in the other phases of the game. A crux of this argument was the fact that after a breakout 2013, Paul Goldschmidt has cemented himself as one of the game’s young stars, forcing the 6’4”, 235 lb Trumbo to an outfield corner.

    While allowing Trumbo to roam the outfield may present a risk, it’s a calculated one, and it has a chance to pay off in a big way. If Trumbo can prove he has the defensive versatility to handle left field, he could become an immensely valuable piece for a team that projects to be on the fringes of the playoff picture, and there are reasons to believe he’ll thrive as a former Angel in the outfield.

    As a defender, Trumbo has taken an interesting path in his career up to this point. In 2011, his first full season in the majors, Trumbo was Los Angeles’ everyday first baseman, getting each of his 143 starts at the position. Then, in 2012, the Angels made the biggest splash of the (or nearly any) offseason in signing Albert Pujols. With the all-world first baseman locked into his former position, Trumbo was moved around the field, with manager Mike Scioscia attempting to keep his bat in the lineup by trying him at every other defensive corner. He made eight starts at the hot corner in the first month of the season before that experiment was mercifully ended. During the month of May, the Halos tried Trumbo in right, but that idea too was quickly abandoned. Finally, he was shifted across the outfield to left, where he stuck until the end of the season, making 62 starts at the position from the beginning of June on and saving the Angels an estimated seven runs according to BIS’s Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) system.

    After that relatively successful run one would think Trumbo would get an extended look at the position, but the Angels’ situation changed quickly, dictating otherwise. Kendrys Morales was shipped to Seattle, opening up the DH role for whichever one of Pujols and Trumbo wasn’t playing first at any given time. As the season went on, Pujols’ plantar fasciitis issues forced him into everyday DH duty and eventually an early end to his campaign, locking Trumbo into the 1B role. Meanwhile, J.B. Shuck and Kole Calhoun joined a crowded outfield rotation that already included Mike Trout, Josh Hamilton, and Peter Bourjos. In the end, Trumbo played just over 200 innings in the outfield last season, with over two-thirds of those coming in right.

    With a record of less than 600 innings in left, we’re clearly dealing with a small sample, but it will be fascinating to see whether Trumbo continues his pattern of outperforming the expectations dictated by his stature and foot speed in Arizona. Perhaps the most interesting facet of his left field performance is his success on deep balls. While he was slightly below average on shallow and medium-depth balls in 2012, DRS suggested that he prevented 13 extra bases on deep balls compared to an average left fielder. While he’s clearly not the quickest or most athletic player at the position, it is possible that he makes up for his lack of physical defensive tools with excellent positioning, jumps, and routes. It’s also entirely possible that his success in left is a small-sample statistical blip, and if that’s the case, he and his new employers may be in for something of a rude awakening.

    However, if Trumbo can hold his own as even an average left fielder, he could drastically alter the way he’s perceived by evaluators around the game. First basemen collectively put up a .333 Weighted On Base Average (wOBA) in 2013, putting Trumbo’s career .329 squarely in the middle of the pack. Left fielders, however, combined for just a .317 wOBA, with the more rigorous defensive requirements of the position forcing teams to sacrifice some offense for superior glovework. If Trumbo is an everyday first baseman, he’s a second-division starter. However, as a left fielder with a solid-average glove, he could be an impactful piece in the middle of a contender’s order. It will be interesting to see whether that solid-average glove materializes, but if Trumbo’s 2012 is indicative of his defensive abilities in left, his hidden tool could make him an outstanding acquisition for Kevin Towers and the D’Backs.