On Saturday, Mike Trout hit another milestone in his already outstanding baseball career, although his first four-strikeout game in the majors was a milestone he would have preferred to have taken longer to achieve. After the game, Trout said all the things one would expect him to say after a four-strikeout effort: he tipped his hat to starting pitcher Max Scherzer, mentioned the Angels failed to capitalize on the few mistakes Scherzer did make, and that he’ll take the same approach into the next game. Four-strikeout games are more commonplace in 2014 — many would argue far too common — but it took Mike Trout 353 career games to have his first “golden sombrero.” One of the more fun things about Mike Trout is that we can justifiably compare him to other great players in baseball history.

So let’s see how many games it took for other great players in baseball history to rack up their first four-strikeout game. Encompassed among the group of 45 players I looked at were the top 25 in Offensive WAR according to Baseball Reference, as well as other great players who have strong Hall of Fame candidacies.

It took less than 100 games for Mike Schmidt, Derek Jeter, Pete Rose, Alex Rodriguez, and Barry Bonds to have their first four-strikeout game. While they all took quick paths to a four-strikeout game, it only took Reggie Jackson 11 games to get his first of what would be 22 career four-strikeout games (in addition to one five-strikeout game). A hero to a generation of baseball fans, Mickey Mantle had his first four-strikeout effort in his 192^nd career game on August 6, 1952 against Walt Masterson, who twice struck out Yogi Berra and Mantle back-to-back. Miguel Cabrera, the player Trout has finished runner-up to in the last two MVP races, required only 40 games to reach his first four-K game. Perhaps the greatest leadoff hitter of all time, Rickey Henderson, came seven games short of tying Trout’s 353 games, as it took Henderson 346 games to hit the four-strikeout mark.

The list of players who needed more games than Trout’s 353 to have their first four-K game is an interesting list because of their respective career feats. Sluggers Ken Griffey, Jr., Hank Greenberg, Harmon Killebrew, and Willie Mays all had over 380 games under their belt before notching their first four-strikeout game. Jimmie Foxx and Craig Biggio played over 900 games to reach their first; Willie McCovey, Manny Ramirez, and Roberto Clemente played over 1,000 games; and Chipper Jones and Robin Yount played over 2,000 games to reach their first four-strikeout game.

However this type of discussion would not be complete without mentioning the players who’ve NEVER had a four-strikeout game (at least, since 1914, which is as far back as I found data for). Babe Ruth, along with his 714 home runs, never had a single four-strikeout game in his career. Neither did the man who broke his record. Hank Aaron played in 3,298 games over 23 seasons and never had a four-strikeout game. Joe DiMaggio, Lou Gehrig, Stan Musial, Ted Williams, and Mel Ott never had four strikeouts in a game. In more recent vintage, Tony Gwynn, Barry Larkin, George Brett, and Carl Yastrzemski never had four K’s in a game. Two players in the latter half of their potentially Hall of Fame careers, Ichiro Suzuki and Albert Pujols have yet to put a four-strikeout performance into a box score.

Part of Mike Trout’s appeal is his ability to do literally anything on a baseball field. Trout is a line-drive hitter with over-the-fence power. He can propel his prototypical linebacker body to a 6.5-second 60-yard dash and possesses a plus arm that he used to draw accolades on the mound as an amateur. His incredible speed and universally acknowledged baseball instincts and feel for the game made it all the more surprising when he graded out as a subpar defender in 2013 by Defensive Runs Saved. Last year, Trout totaled a nine-run deficit as compared to an average center fielder after saving the Angels 23 runs in center the season before. With his limited Major League track record, and two vastly divergent defensive seasons, it’s difficult to get a read on Trout as a defender. In order to further that understanding, we can take a look at players who experienced a similar drop in defensive performance and how their defense ranked in later seasons.

To do so, I assembled a list of all the outfielders whose Runs Saved totals fell by more than 20 runs from one year to the next at a single position. That list features 25 pairs of seasons, including Trout’s 2012-13. Two other outfielders in the group also experienced their drop from 2012 to 2013, with Michael Bourn falling almost to neutral after saving 24 runs in 2012, and Torii Hunter costing the Tigers 10 runs as their right fielder last season after saving the Angels 15 the year before. Because we don’t know how they bounced back from their down seasons, it isn’t instructive to include them in this investigation. In addition, we will be unable to glean any relevant information from a player whose down year resulted in his moving off of the position at which he faltered. Hunter’s move to right was precipitated by a disappointing final season manning center for the Angels. He and Andruw Jones changed positions following their down years, while Scott Podsednik failed to see Major League action at all in 2011 after costing the Royals and Dodgers a combined 15 runs in left the prior season. Removing these six pairs of seasons, we have a list of 19 season-pairs in which an outfielder dropped by more than 20 runs from his previous season at the same position and continued to play that position for at least the next season.

So, what does this group tell us about Trout? In order to answer that question, we first need to determine which of these players’ declines were similar to Trout’s and which ones have very little bearing on our projection of Trout’s future performance. I’ve chosen the simple split between players whose decrease in defensive production was related to an injury and those whose deterioration had no apparent injury associated with it (as was the case for Trout).

If a player’s drop in Defensive Runs Saved is the result of an injury, his career arc tells us very little about Trout’s future, so we’ll leave those players out when attempting to project Trout for 2014 and beyond. The list of players whose decline was precipitated by an injury includes Curtis Granderson in 2008 (finger fracture), Aaron Rowand in 2006 (nose/ankle fracture), Willy Taveras in 2007 (groin/quad strain), and Austin Jackson in 2012 (abdominal strain).

We are now left with a group of 15 outfielders who had a decline in defensive performance of more than 20 runs which cannot obviously be explained by injury. The list ranges from players who started as exceptional defenders and fell to average to outfielders who began near average and landed among the worst players in the league at their position and everything in between.

Trout’s best-case scenario, at least for this season, may well be represented by Michael Bourn’s 2010-2012 seasons. Bourn enjoyed an outstanding 2010 campaign in which he saved 30 runs, making him the best fielder in baseball at any position for that year and earning him a deserved second Gold Glove, as well as his first Fielding Bible Award. While his offense took a significant step forward in 2011, his defense did the opposite, plummeting to three runs below the average center fielder. Bourn’s defensive woes led to a decline in overall production despite a career year with the bat that was split between Houston and Atlanta. In 2012, however, Bourn put it all together, regaining nearly all of his defensive value at 24 Runs Saved while maintaining his offensive gains to post a season valued by Fangraphs at over six Wins Above Replacement (WAR).

While Trout hopes to achieve a similar bounce-back, there are several important differences between his 2010-11 and Trout’s first two MLB seasons. Trout burst on the scene with his superlative defensive year, while Bourn built up to it, beginning his career as a solid defender and evolving into one of the best glove-men in the league by his third full season.  In addition, Bourn played the 2010 season at 27 years of age, after being drafted out of the University of Houston and playing the majority of four seasons in the minors. Finally, considering a longer timeframe, Bourn lost a significant portion of the defensive value he regained in 2013. If Trout bounces back, he will hope to maintain those gains into future seasons.

Trout’s (and the Angels’) nightmare situation would look something like Nick Markakis’ 2008-2010. When Markakis saved 22 runs in his age-24 season, thanks largely to his 10-run arm that season, it appeared as though he was poised to establish himself as one of the best all-around outfielders in the American League as he entered his prime. Instead, his defense took a step back in 2009, as he cost the Orioles three runs in the field. The following season, Markakis’ defense fell further, as he cost the Orioles 11 runs and transformed from the best right fielder in the AL to the worst in a span of just two seasons. It’s hard to imagine a player with Trout’s speed and instincts falling further below average after last season, but those cursed with a healthy degree of pessimism can consider Markakis to be his absolute floor.

As for a likely middle-ground scenario, Franklin Gutierrez’s 2009-2011 probably represents the most apt comparison. In 2009, Gutierrez saved 32 runs, leading all positions as the best defender in the game. In 2010, however, he fell back to earth, grading out as a neutral defender. Gutierrez regained some of his defensive value in 2011, saving an excellent but not earth-shattering 10 runs. This is on par with the bounce-backs of many of the outfielders in the sample, although most didn’t start out with a DRS total among the league leaders, as these three examples and Trout all did.

As logic would dictate, the larger group of outfielders suggests that Trout is likely to recover some, but not all, of the defensive value he provided in 2012. Of the 15 outfielders, all but three improved in the year following their drop-off. Regression is likely part of the explanation, but there does seem to be a significant trend towards these defenders returning at least some of the way to their superior pre-decline performance. The following table presents the average performance over the three-year period in question for each of these players.

On the whole, these players generally bounce back somewhat from their down seasons, reclaiming nearly half of the performance they lost in their decline years. However, the sample looks even more favorable for Trout when considering only his peers in center field.

Each of the six center fielders in the sample showed at least some improvement from their down seasons, and on average their third-year performance was closer to their Runs Saved total prior to the decline than it was to their valuation in their down season. Three of the center fielders (Matthews Jr. in 2008, Kemp in 2011, and Bourn in 2012) had a bounce-back of 20 or more runs.

While these conclusions were reached by two very different methods, the results of this analysis agree with Ken Woolums’ earlier Good Fielding Play/Defensive Misplay-focused look at Trout’s first two seasons in the field. While Trout won’t necessarily perform at the average of his comparable players, it seems as though his true talent level is likely in an intermediate range, in which he’s not as bad as his 2013, and not quite as good as his incredible rookie season, but rather somewhere in between. Although Trout as a total package is essentially unmatched among players in baseball’s current era, we may still be able to learn more about each of his specific skills by analyzing a group of players with a focus on one part of his game. Trout’s defense will be an interesting storyline for the 2014 season, as he hopes to realign his glovework with the rest of his elite five-tool profile.

Last season, A.J. Burnett pitched 191 stellar innings, leading Pittsburgh to its first postseason appearance since Sid Bream’s slide ended the 1992 NLDS. Burnett’s 3.30 ERA was backed up by even better peripherals, as his 2.80 Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) mark was fifth among qualified NL hurlers. While Burnett certainly deserves a lot of credit for his own excellence, the Pirates’ front office put him in a position to succeed, deploying a stingy and well-aligned defense behind him. Although Burnett didn’t always agree with the alignment of that defense, he certainly benefitted from it. As one of the most extreme groundball pitchers in the game, Burnett gets disproportionate benefits from a strong and well-positioned defensive infield like the one he pitched in front of last year, while a poor group of infielders could hurt him more than most.

Unfortunately for Burnett, his new coworkers include just such a group of infielders. While Pittsburgh received solid infield defense across the board last season, the Phillies occupied the other end of the spectrum, combining around the horn to allow 50 runs more than an average group of infielders. While 18 of those runs are attributable to the now-retired Michael Young, Young’s replacement is unlikely to be stellar, either. Cody Asche, who cost the team seven runs in nearly 400 late-season innings in 2013, is projected for -10 DRS this season, so we’ll replace Philadelphia’s atrocious 25 runs cost at the hot corner in 2013 with that more generous -10.

In order to provide a rough estimate of what AJ Burnett’s 2013 would look like with the 2014 Phillies, we’ll assume that those runs cost and saved were evenly distributed. That is, given that Burnett’s 191 frames accounted for 13 percent of the innings tossed by Pirates pitchers last year, we’ll assume he benefitted from 13 percent of the runs saved by their defense. While a more in-depth analysis would consider Burnett’s batted ball types, pull percentages, and the resulting impact of the various fielders on his performance, for simplicity’s sake, we’ll stick to the quality of the defense behind him as a whole to estimate the magnitude of the possible effect on Burnett’s numbers.

This back-of-the-envelope calculation estimates the Pirates’ defense saved Burnett just over nine runs last season. Replacing Philly’s third base defense with Asche’s projection (a 15-run improvement) and assuming Burnett shoulders a similar percentage of the pitching load for the Phillies this year results in an estimated 11 additional runs cost against an average defense by the gloves behind him. Burnett allowed 79 runs last season, so by this admittedly simple accounting, the switch in defenses would bump that up to a little over 99 runs.

Burnett will also be switching parks from a fairly pitcher-friendly PNC to the homer-happy Citizen’s Bank. Making the broad assumption that his talent level at home and on the road is fairly similar, we’ll bump his runs at home up from 49 (half of the defense-adjusted 99 runs) by about 22 percent, or the difference between Pittsburgh and Philly’s park factors for runs. Between the less favorable defense and park, we’d now expect Burnett to allow 109 runs next season, raising his runs allowed per nine innings from 3.72 to 5.13.

In other words, by this estimate, the change in defenses and parks drops Burnett from a pitcher in the top half of the league to nearly the same level of production as the 2013 season of his new rotation-mate, Kyle Kendrick. While Burnett may have complained about the Pirates’ atypical alignments last season, it probably won’t be long before he’s pining for his days in western Pennsylvania.

Derek Jeter recently announced through Facebook that the 2014 season would be his last. Immediately upon his announcement, ticket prices for Jeter’s final home game at Yankee Stadium soared. Before the announcement, tickets for the September 25^th game against the Baltimore Orioles were selling for less than $100 on StubHub; however, within 10 minutes after the announcement all of those tickets were sold. By the end of the day, average ticket prices for the game were selling for over $1,100.

Due to the considerable cost for tickets and the opportunity to witness the final at-bats of a surefire Hall of Famer, it’s not a giant leap to suggest that Yankee fans get to their seats before Jeter steps into the batter’s box. Setting aside cost and nostalgia, the reason Yankee fans should be in their seats before his arrival to the plate is because Jeter may not be at the plate for very long. Derek Jeter has a reputation as a grinder, with a knack for fighting off tough pitches and driving at-bats into deep counts. However, as great as Jeter has been in deep counts, he’s also had remarkable success on the first pitch of at-bats during his career.

Derek Jeter has not been shy about swinging at the first pitch. Prior to his injury-plagued 2013 campaign, Jeter averaged 96 one-and-done at-bats from 2002-2012. Also including 2013, about 15.5 percent of all of Jeter’s total at-bats have been one pitch in length. Jeter’s aggressive approach at the plate has yielded significant results with a slash line of .365/.384/.526, all better than his overall rates in any count during the span.

In fact, in 2012, Jeter’s last full season, he was even more aggressive at the outset of at-bats. In 119 one-and-done at-bats, Jeter had another terrific year with a line of .345/.361/.479; about 17.4 percent of his total at-bats were of the one-pitch variety. It is unlikely that Derek Jeter’s aggressive approach will wane in his final season, so Yankee fans should be in their seats early for his final at-bats because some of them will only be one pitch long.

Los Angeles Dodgers’ right fielder Yasiel Puig emerged as an instant sensation when he debuted June 3^rd in a Dodgers’ victory. A defector from Cuba, Puig immediately contributed to the Dodgers turnaround midseason from division bottom feeder to pennant contender. Puig made many “web gems” on defense, from outstanding throws to amazing catches; he showed no dearth of extravagant plays. Amidst Puig’s rise to stardom were critics who focused attention on his at-times lethargic play and perceived lack of fundamentals on defense. But was all the noise and critique surrounding his defense warranted? Digging into Yasiel Puig’s defensive misplays and errors will help determine if his perceived lack of fundamentals on defense was justified.

Yasiel Puig’s effort was brought into the discussion concerning his defense during the season, to the point that Dodgers manager Don Mattingly removed Puig after the fourth inning of a Dodgers victory in August. The exact reason for Puig’s removal wasn’t revealed, but Puig said after the game through an interpreter that he was not preparing well for each pitch on defense and that he understood manager Don Mattingly’s decision. While this supports the supposition that Puig at times struggled with his level of effort during the year, there is a distinct difference between the lack of effort Puig displayed and the absence of fundamentals on defense.

Concentrating on the categories in which Yasiel Puig had two or more Defensive Misplays or Errors (DMEs) isolates the actions where Puig made repeated mistakes during the season. There were five such types. These five areas accounted for more than three-quarters of all the defensive misplays that Puig accrued during the 2013 season:

Despite these problem areas, Puig was ninth among all right fielders in saving runs for his team in 2013. In fact, Puig was far from the only right fielder among the top 10 in Defensive Runs Saved to have similar defensive misplays. Jay Bruce and Marlon Byrd had more cases of mishandling a ball after a safe hit and Josh Reddick had more wasted throws after hits. Each of those players saved more runs last season than Puig. Moreover the leader in Runs Saved last season, Diamondbacks’ outfielder Gerardo Parra had more misplays concerning failed dive attempts after fly balls and instances where the ball bounced off his glove than any right fielder among the top 10. Additionally Puig took fewer bad routes to balls than either Parra or Shane Victorino, who finished second in Runs Saved last season.

The misplays Yasiel Puig committed in 2013 arguably reflect more on his judgment as a first-year major leaguer than his defensive fundamentals. The over aggressiveness displayed by Puig in the field may have led to his failed dive attempts as well as wasted throws on the bases resulting in the needless advancement of runners. Balls careening off his glove could potentially be a byproduct of his speed, enabling him to get closer to more balls in the air rather than letting those balls drop in front of him, which would have allowed him to play them cleanly. Conversely, Puig undeniably struggled last season with a high number of mishandled balls after hits and poor routes to balls. Nevertheless, his overall numbers in the five misplay categories did not vastly differ from other elite right fielders in the game.

Baltimore Orioles shortstop, JJ Hardy, is one the top defensive shortstops in Major League Baseball. However, despite finishing 2013 statistically among the top five shortstops in Defensive Runs Saved (estimated number of runs saved by player for his team), he is widely considered on the second tier of shortstops in the game. Hardy is often regarded by critics as consistent but never flashy, solid but not in the elite company of Andrelton Simmons or Troy Tulowitzki.

Hardy has been as consistent and steady as any shortstop in the game, finishing the last three seasons in the top ten in Defensive Runs Saved. When looking closer at defensive play, specifically the good fielding plays (GFPs) that Hardy made during the 2013 season, a signature skill pops out of the data. Hardy made an exceptionally quick pivot around second base to turn a double play 11 times in 2013. In fact, of the top ten shortstops according to Defensive Runs Saved, only Troy Tulowitzki and Andrelton Simmons came within three Good Fielding Plays of Hardy’s total with eight and seven, respectively.

Last season, Hardy made more exceptional quick pivots to turn double plays than any middle infielder in the league. Former Yankee and now Seattle Mariner second basemen Robinson Cano led the league in exceptional quick pivots to turn double plays in 2011 and 2012 and finished second in 2013 behind only Hardy. Cano, known for his extraordinarily quick hands and smooth footwork, has had a remarkable three-year run posting double-digit totals over the last three seasons. Meanwhile, JJ Hardy improved his total of quick pivots on double plays each season from 2010 through 2013, the final three of which were in Baltimore. This ability to quickly pivot around second base and turn the double play is a repeatable skill that these players have improved and mastered over the last several years.

JJ Hardy’s style in the field may not grab him many headlines or make many highlight reels, but his style is supremely effective. While even he will not toot his own horn about his defensive prowess, in an interview with David Laurila of FanGraphs, Hardy described his style, “I’d characterize my style as not having much style. I try to just catch the ball and throw the ball. I don’t try to be flashy. I just try to make every play that I can.” Hardy is making more than his fair share of double plays around second base and has proven to be an elite shortstop in the game.

With the 2013 World Series underway on Wednesday between the Boston Red Sox and St. Louis Cardinals, it seems like a great time to take a look at how each team stacks up against one another defensively.

Baseball Info Solutions estimates that the Red Sox saved 24 runs with their defense this season.  That is 63 runs better than the Cardinals, whose defense cost them 39 runs. The Red Sox were tied with the Rays and Yankees for the 4th-highest total of Defensive Runs Saved in the American League, trailing only the Royals, Rangers, and Orioles. The Cardinals on the other hand, come in at 14th in the National League, ahead of only the Phillies.

Here is how the Red Sox and Cardinals stack up against each other by position using Defensive Runs Saved:

The Red Sox have four positions (1B, 2B, CF, RF) in which they have positive Defensive Runs Saved, whereas the Cardinals only have one (C). The biggest contrast between the two teams is in their outfield, where the Red Sox have saved 27 runs defensively, whereas the Cardinals are on the complete opposite end of the spectrum with -27 Defensive Runs Saved. In fact, the Red Sox have two players ranked in the top-10 in Defensive Runs Saved at their respective positions. Shane Victorino saved 24 Runs, and was second only to Gerrardo Parra’s 36 in right field. Jacoby Ellsbury also has the sixth-most Defensive Runs Saved for a center fielder with 13. Amazingly, as good of a hitter as Matt Holliday is, he has actually cost the Cardinals an estimated 13 runs with his poor defense.

The discrepancy between the Red Sox and Cardinals on defense is not limited to the teams’ players.  Strategy has also favored the Red Sox, particularly when it comes to the defensive shift.  The Red Sox had 477 shifts on balls in play this season, the seventh-highest total in baseball.  Their heavy shifting helped Boston save an estimated 15 runs.  Meanwhile the Cardinals shifted on only 107 balls in play, the eighth-lowest total, and did not save a run by doing so.

At the end of the day, the World Series will be a great matchup between two heavyweights. It looks as if the Red Sox have focused a little bit more on the defensive side than the Cardinals this season by utilizing quality defensive players and effective shifts. It will definitely be a battle of good pitching, good hitting, and of course good defense. So be sure to watch the 2013 World Series beginning this Wednesday night.

In 2012, Mike Trout burst onto the Major League scene with what can be considered one of the greatest rookie campaigns of all time. While he was a strong offensive player and baserunner, Trout made defense his calling card. As he ran, jumped, and dove across the field making one great play after another, the industry became enamored with his defensive ability. However, that defensive success did not carry over into his sophomore season as his defensive ratings were down across the board.

Many individuals may claim that this is due to a flaw in the manner by which defensive metrics are calculated, but the data shows that this may very well be a case of confirmation bias. Rather than trust the data that helps lead to conclusions, individuals use their own preconceived notions to justify Trout’s defensive prominence. Digging into the numbers shows a few noticeable aspects of Trout’s game that have changed.

A good place to start is with the part of Trout’s game that got everyone’s attention: the Good Fielding Plays (GFPs). In 2013, Trout tallied 24 total GFPs (similar GFP types have been grouped here):

These plays are fine and dandy, but there is a noticeable difference between his 2013 GFPs and his 2012 GFPs. The general theme is that there are fewer of them:

When good fielding plays occur, it is tracked whether the play saved the team a base or created an unexpected out. By looking at Trout’s 2012 GFPs, he recorded 28 unexpected outs and saved 3 additional bases (twice saving second base and once saving third base). In 2013, Trout has only recorded 23 unexpected outs and has only saved 2 additional bases (second base in both cases). However, the difference between 2012 and 2013 is bigger than this difference, as three of the additional unexpected outs recorded in 2012 were robbed home runs. This means the prevention of guaranteed runs being recorded instead of prevention of hits.

While Trout made fewer GFPs in 2013 than he did in 2012, he made the same number of Defensive Misplays and Errors:

Trout had fewer miscellaneous DMEs such as slipping or hesitating in 2013, but he racked up misplays in categories that are a more routine part of his duties as an outfielder. As may be noticed right away, Trout had three more balls bounce off his glove this year than last year, which essentially makes up the difference between flyball GFPs (assuming that the “Ball Bounces Off of Glove” DMEs would be GFPs if the plays were made). Trout also had a couple of routes so bad that they have cost him outs, and he had a much tougher time playing balls at the wall. Instead of robbing home runs at the wall and making great plays, he misplayed five balls at or off of the wall that have cost him outs and bases.

The DMEs here suggest is that Trout’s ability to judge plays may have decreased from 2012 to 2013. While he had three fewer failed dives at balls, he also misplayed five balls at the wall, made two mistakes in breaks and routes, and threw to the wrong base on two occasions. There could be many explanations for this, but Trout is likely the only one who can truly explain any differences since judgement is a mental process.

On whether or not Trout has actually become a worse defender, the jury is still out. There are certain aspects that Trout doesn’t have control over such as whether balls are hit in a spot that he can rob a home run. Along with that, Trout had a few instances where a ball bounced off of his glove rather than being caught for a likely GFP, and if these instances are a matter of inches, there may not be any loss of skill at all. However, there is also an apparent negative trend in the ability to make judgement plays. In all likelihood, Trout’s abilities as a defender lie between what he did in 2012 and in 2013. He still has the physical abilities, so it’s just a matter of overcoming the lapses in judgement.